worked a couple of hours.

On September 17th, Ms. Johnson was tardy due to oversleeping. The employer terminated her for exceeded six points pursuant to their attendance policy.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2009) provides:

Discharge for Misconduct. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The Iowa Supreme court has accepted this definition as reflecting the intent of the legislature. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665, (Iowa 2000) (quoting Reigelsberger v. Employment Appeal Board, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. <u>Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

The claimant was discharged for going over six points based on the employer's no fault attendance

policy. The record establishes that the majority of her absences were due to illnesses that were properly reported. The Board would note that the employer's 'point system' is not dispositive of misconduct. The court in

<u>Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982) held that absences due to illness, which are properly reported, are excused and not misconduct. See also, <u>Gaborit v. Employment Appeal</u> <u>Board</u>, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007) wherein the court held an absence can be excused for purposes of unemployment insurance eligibility even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy.

The claimant's final absence was an alleged no call/no show on August 19th and a few tardies. The claimant provided credible statements that she did report to work on August 19th, albeit for only a couple of hours. The employer did not issue any warnings to her that her job was in jeopardy. Plus, if she had been counted as a no call/no show, then by the employer's own policy, she would have been terminated that very day. (See, Employer's 'Employee Points Detail Report, p. 2) Ms. Johnson may have had a few tardies, however, there is nothing in the file to establish that her behavior was "... carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability... or... [showed] an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests.." See, 871 IAC 24.32(1)"a", supra. While the employer may have compelling business reasons to terminate the claimant, conduct that might warrant a discharge from employment will not necessarily sustain a disqualification from job insurance benefits. Budding v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 337 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa App. 1983). For this reason, we conclude that the employer failed to satisfy their burden of proof.

DECISION:

The administrative law judge's decision dated November 20, 2009 is **REVERSED**. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, she is allowed benefits provided she is otherwise eligible.

John A. Peno

Elizabeth L. Seiser

AMG/fnv

DISSENTING OPINION OF MONIQUE F. KUESTER:

I respectfully dissent from the majority decision of the Employment Appeal Board; I would affirm the decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety.

AMG/fnv

Monique F. Kuester

A portion of the claimant's appeal to the Employment Appeal Board consisted of additional evidence which was not contained in the administrative file and which was not submitted to the administrative law judge. While the appeal and additional evidence (documents) were reviewed, the Employment Appeal Board, in its discretion, finds that the admission of the additional evidence is not warranted in reaching today's decision.

John A. Peno

Elizabeth L. Seiser

Monique F. Kuester

AMG/fnv