# BEFORE THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD

Lucas State Office Building Fourth floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319

:

JONATHAN G BACON

**HEARING NUMBER:** 16B-UI-10452

Claimant

.

and

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD DECISION

BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE

**Employer** 

# NOTICE

**THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL** unless (1) a **request for a REHEARING** is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within **20 days** of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a **PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT** IS FILED WITHIN **30 days** of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

**SECTION:** 96.5-2-A, 96.3-7

#### DECISION

#### UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE ALLOWED IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE

The Claimant appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. A majority of the Appeal Board, one member dissenting, finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The majority of the Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

## FINDINGS OF FACT:

Jonathan Bacon (Claimant) worked for Bridgestone America's Tire (Employer) as a fulltime Maintenance Technician from February 4, 2004 until he was fired on August 30, 2016.

On August 19, 2016, the Claimant was talking to a co-worker in the break room by the staff refrigerator. The Claimant's co-worker had not brought his usual four energy drinks that day. As a joke the Claimant took the energy drink of another employee (Ryan) and handed it to the worker who had forgotten his. The Claimant had intended this as a joke and planned to return the drink to the refrigerator but he was distracted by others in the room and forgot about the incident.

When Ryan complained about the loss of his energy drink the Employer reviewed surveillance video. It showed the Claimant removing the drink from the refrigerator. When questioned, the Claimant did not deny this. The Employer then fired the Claimant over this incident. The Claimant had no prior warnings in twelve years of employment for anything similar.

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2016) provides:

*Discharge for Misconduct*. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

"This is the meaning which has been given the term in other jurisdictions under similar statutes, and we believe it accurately reflects the intent of the legislature." *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d, 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

It is the duty of the Board as the ultimate trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. Arndt v. City of LeClaire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The Board, as the finder of fact, may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. State v. Holtz, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, as well as the weight to give other evidence, a Board member should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. State v. Holtz, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In determining the facts, and deciding what evidence to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence the Board believes; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. State v. Holtz, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). The Board also gives weight to the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge concerning credibility and weight of evidence, particularly where the hearing is in-person, although the Board is not bound by that opinion. Iowa Code §17A.10(3); Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 322 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Iowa 1982). The findings of fact show how we have resolved the disputed factual issues in this case. We have carefully weighed the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the evidence considering the applicable factors listed above, and the Board's collective common sense and experience. We have found credible the testimony from the Claimant that this was simply a small attempt at humor, and then he became distracted. We believe the Claimant that he was not intending to take the drink to be consumed, that he did not retain possession of the drink after taking it from the refrigerator, and that he had intended to return the drink.

This is a theft case in only a very strained and artificial sense. The Claimant did take possession of an energy drink that was not his. The evidence shows he did not intend to convert it to his use by consuming it or giving it to another to consume. All he was doing was making a joke, and then the joke went awry when he got distracted. In a twelve year career with the Employer there is no evidence of a prior warning of any sort. The Claimant's joke is nothing more than an isolated "good faith error in judgment" and is not disqualifying.

It is the Employer's prerogative to have an exceedingly strict zero tolerance policy and to terminate for any violation of it. For our purposes, however, it does not *necessarily* follow that misconduct is proven. We apply the legal standards and not just the Employer's policies. We note, as we have often done, that conduct that might warrant a discharge from employment will not necessarily sustain a disqualification from job insurance benefits. *Kelly v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service*, 386 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa App. 1986); *Budding v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 337 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa App. 1983); *Newman v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806, 808 (Iowa App. 1984). This case falls into that category and we accordingly allow benefits today.

The Claimant submitted additional evidence to the Board which was not contained in the administrative file and which was not submitted to the administrative law judge. While the additional evidence was reviewed for the purposes of determining whether admission of the evidence was warranted despite it not being presented at hearing, the Employment Appeal Board, in its discretion, finds that the admission of the additional evidence is not warranted in reaching today's decision. There is no sufficient cause why the new and additional information submitted by the Claimant was not presented at hearing. Accordingly none of the new and additional information submitted has been relied upon in making our decision, and none of it has received any weight whatsoever, but rather all of it has been wholly disregarded.

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Board concludes that the Claimant was discharge	ctober 18, 2016 is <b>REVERSED</b> . The Employment Appeal ed for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, the Claimant rwise eligible. The overpayment entered against Claimant.
$\overline{A}$	Ashley R. Koopmans
J.	ames M. Strohman
DISSENTING OPINION OF KIM D. SCHMI	ETT:
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision decision of the administrative law judge in its entitle.	n of the Employment Appeal Board; I would affirm the irety.
- K	Kim D. Schmett