# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**AMY E KALLSEN** 

Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 12A-UI-12974-H2T** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

HOLY SPIRIT RETIREMENT HOME

Employer

OC: 09-30-12

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.4(3) – Able and Available

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed a timely appeal from the October 19, 2012 reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on November 30, 2012. The claimant did participate. The employer did participate through Dorene Becker, Human Relations Coordinator and Patrick Tomscha, Administrator. Claimant's Exhibit A was entered and received into the record. Employer's Exhibit One was entered and received into the record.

#### **ISSUES:**

Was the claimant discharged due to job connected misconduct?

Is the claimant able to and available for work?

### FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a certified nurse's assistant full time beginning September 16, 1998 through September 24, 2012 when she was discharged. The claimant was off work due to a non-work-related injury beginning on June 26, 2012. She was not released to return to work by her treating physician until October 3, 2012. She was never released to return to work with any type of light-duty work restrictions before she was discharged. The employer discharged the claimant on September 24, 2012 because she had used up all of her 12 weeks of Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave that was allotted to her. The claimant was discharged for no other reason other than she had not physically recovered enough to return to work prior to the expiration of her leave on September 24, 2012.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant did not quit but was discharged for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

## 871 IAC 24.25(35) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code Section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code Section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

- (35) The claimant left because of illness or injury which was not caused or aggravated by the employment or pregnancy and failed to:
- (a) Obtain the advice of a licensed and practicing physician;
- (b) Obtain certification of release for work from a licensed and practicing physician;
- (c) Return to the employer and offer services upon recovery and certification for work by a licensed and practicing physician; or
- (d) Fully recover so that the claimant could perform all of the duties of the job.

The court in Gilmore v. Empl. Appeal Bd., 695 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) noted that:

"Insofar as the Employment Security Law is not designed to provide health and disability insurance, only those employees who experience illness-induced separations that can fairly be attributed to the employer are properly eligible for unemployment benefits." White v. Employment Appeal Bd., 487 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1992) (citing Butts v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 328 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1983)).

The statute provides an exception where:

The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence

immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and ... the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible. lowa Code § 96.5(1)(d).

Section 96.5(1)(d) specifically requires that the employee has recovered from the illness or injury, and this recovery has been certified by a physician. The exception in Section 96.5(1)(d) only applies when an employee is fully recovered and the employer has not held open the employee's position. *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 346; *Hedges v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 368 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); see also *Geiken v. Lutheran Home for the Aged Ass'n*, 468 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1991) (noting the full recovery standard of Section 96.5(1)(d)).

The claimant was not required to return to the employer to offer services after the medical recovery because she had already been involuntarily terminated from the employment while under medical care. Thus, the separation was a discharge.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Although employer is not obligated to provide light duty work for an employee whose illness or injury is not work related, the involuntary termination from employment while under medical care was a discharge from employment. In spite of the expiration of the claimant's FMLA leave period, since claimant was still under medical care and had not yet been released to return to work without restriction as of the date of separation, no disqualifying reason for the separation has been established. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

#### **DECISION:**

The October 19, 2012 (reference 01) decision is reversed. The claimant did not quit but was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Claimant is able to and available for work effective October 3, 2012. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Teresa K. Hillary Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	
tkh/bic	