IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

AKASHA B LAMBERT

Claimant

APPEAL 20A-UI-11879-JC-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TC SUBWAY LLC

Employer

OC: 04/12/20

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Admin, Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 - Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

PL116-136, Sec. 2104 – Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant, TC Subway LLC., filed an appeal from the September 17, 2020 (reference 01) Iowa Workforce Development ("IWD") unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 19, 2020. The claimant, Akasha B. Lambert did not respond to the notice of hearing to furnish a phone number with the Appeals Bureau and did not participate in the hearing. The employer participated through Ted Camano, owner.

The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records. Employer Exhibit 1 (Appeal letter) was admitted. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

Is the claimant eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed part-time as a sandwich artist and was separated from employment on April 7, 2020, when she was discharged.

Claimant was trained on employer rules at time of hire. Employer's policy states that no call/no shows will result in automatic termination. Claimant last performed work on April 1, 2020.

The final incident occurred on April 7, 2020 when claimant was a no call/no show for her 11:00 a.m. shift. Claimant was expected to call in to Mr. Camano or her manager. Employer was unaware if claimant had contact with any other members of management.

Prior to discharge, claimant had been a no call/no show on March 23, 2020. Claimant stated for that incident that she had better things to do. Employer stated she was given a warning.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has a weekly benefit amount of \$72.00 but has not received unemployment benefits or Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation since filing her claim with an effective date of April 12, 2020. Ted Camano replied in writing to the fact-finding interview.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged but not for disqualifying job-related misconduct.

lowa law disqualifies individuals who are discharged from employment for misconduct from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a. They remain disqualified until such time as they requalify for benefits by working and earning insured wages ten times their weekly benefit amount. *Id.*

Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.32(1)a provides:

"Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

In the specific context of absenteeism the administrative code provides:

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

871 IAC 24.32(7); See Higgins v. IDJS, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190 n. 1 (lowa 1984)("rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law").

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10(lowa 1982). Second, the unexcused absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Employment Appeal Bd*, 437 N.W.2d 895, 897 (lowa 1989).

An employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified in a timely manner as to when and why the employee is unable to report to work. Claimant in this case had two unexcused absences by way of no call/no show on March 23, 2020 and April 7, 2020.

The second step in the analysis is to determine whether the unexcused absences were excessive. Excessive absenteeism has been found when there has been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984), *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982).

In this case, the claimant was discharged for two absences. Based on the evidence presented, this does not meet the excessiveness standard required. The question before the administrative law judge in this case is not whether the employer has the right to discharge this employee, but whether the claimant's discharge is disqualifying under the provisions of the lowa Employment Security Law. While the decision to terminate the claimant may have been a sound decision from a management viewpoint, for the above stated reasons, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not sustained its burden of proof in establishing that the claimant's discharge was due to a final or current act of job related misconduct. Accordingly, benefits are allowed provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Because the claimant is eligible for benefits, the issues of overpayment of regular unemployment insurance benefits and relief of charges are moot. (At this time, claimant has not received any benefits) Because the claimant is allowed regular unemployment insurance benefits, she is also eligible for FPUC, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer is not charged for these federal benefits.

DECISION:

The September 17, 2020, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

genrique d. Beckman

Jennifer L. Beckman Administrative Law Judge Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau Iowa Workforce Development 1000 East Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209 Fax 515-478-3528

<u>December 21, 2020</u> Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn