

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

ABBAY L PERKINS

Claimant

THE VGM GROUP INC

Employer

APPEAL 15A-UI-07464-SC-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 06/14/15

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the June 26, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon the determination she was discharged for repeated tardiness after being warned. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on July 31, 2015. Claimant Abbey Perkins participated on her own behalf. Employer The VGM Group, Inc. participated through Human Resources Director Nancy Demro.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full time as an outbound patient care coordinator beginning October 28, 2013, and was separated from employment on June 15, 2015, when she was terminated. The claimant worked in a call center environment which has an attendance policy that does not allow for any tardiness. She had previously had issues with tardiness which culminated in a written warning and 30-day probation which began on April 9, 2015. During a progress meeting later that month, Operations Manager Shanon Eckhardt shared with the claimant's team that due to the construction work in the parking lot, the employees would be granted a seven-minute grace period after their scheduled start time to arrive at work.

On May 12, 2015, the claimant met with her supervisor Hilary Schimdt and Eckhardt to follow-up on the 30-day probation. At that time, Eckhardt told her that her performance had improved and the "slate was wiped clean" with regard to her attendance and tardiness. The claimant was one to five minutes late to work on twelve different occasions leading up to June 8, 2015.

On June 8, 2015, the claimant was running late to work from a doctor's appointment she had that morning. She arrived at work 11 minutes late. She had previously notified her supervisor she might be late and she called the supervisor line that morning to notify her supervisor she

was going to be late. The claimant was terminated on June 15, 2015 due to excessive absenteeism.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608. The employer had Eckhardt registered to participate in the hearing; however, Eckhardt was on vacation at the time of the hearing. The employer did not request a continuance or provide a signed statement from Eckhardt for the hearing. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser*, *id.*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand reports, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer.

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job*

Serv., 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law."

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra*.

An employer's attendance policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits. A properly reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of the Iowa Employment Security Act. Excessive absences are not necessarily unexcused. Absences must be both excessive and unexcused to result in a finding of misconduct. A failure to report to work without notification to the employer is generally considered an unexcused absence.

The employer has not established that claimant had excessive absences which would be considered unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance eligibility. Because her last absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct. Since the employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Even if the last tardiness was unexcused and her history of other incidents was examined, the previous twelve incidents of tardiness fell within the seven-minute grace period outlined by Eckhardt at the progress meeting and were excused. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The June 26, 2015, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. The benefits withheld based upon this separation shall be paid to claimant.

Stephanie R. Callahan
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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