IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

ABUBAKAR M SHEIKH

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 06A-UI-10123-S2T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TITAN TIRE CORPORATION

Employer

OC: 12/25/05 R: 02 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-1 - Voluntary Quit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Abubakar Sheikh (claimant) appealed a representative's October 6, 2006 decision (reference 05) that concluded she was not eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she had voluntarily quit employment with Titan Tire Corporation (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 31, 2006. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated by Joyce Kain, Human Resources Manager.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: The claimant was hired on March 23, 1999, as a full-time tire builder. The claimant suffered from headaches and sought medical treatment. His physician excused him from work from May 22 through August 30, 2006. On August 31, 2006, when the claimant was set to return to work, he still felt ill. He properly reported his absence to the employer on August 31, September 2 and 3, 2006. The following day the claimant notified the employer that he felt well enough to return. The employer told the claimant he was separated from employment due to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue is whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct. For the following reasons the administrative law judge concludes he was not.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Excessive absences are not misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness can never constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The employer must establish not only misconduct but that there was a final incident of misconduct which precipitated the discharge. The last incident of absence was a properly reported illness which occurred on August 31, September 1 and 2, 2006. The claimant's absence does not amount to job misconduct because it was properly reported. The employer has failed to provide any evidence of willful and deliberate misconduct which would be a final incident leading to the discharge. The claimant was discharged but there was no misconduct.

DECISION:

The represe	ntative's	October	6, 2006	decision	(refere	ence 05)) is ı	reverse	d. The	claimant	was
discharged.	Miscond	uct has r	not been	establish	ed. Be	enefits a	are a	llowed,	provided	I the clai	mant
is otherwise	eligible.										

Beth A. Scheetz

Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/cs