

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

SHARON JOHNSON
Claimant

HY VEE INC
Employer

APPEAL 21A-UI-19556-CS-T
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 04/18/21
Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code §96.5(2)a-Discharge/Misconduct
Iowa Code §96.5(1)- Voluntary Quit
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On September 3, 2021, the claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the July 13, 2021, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that disallowed benefits based on claimant voluntarily quitting for personal reasons. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on October 25, 2021. Claimant participated during the hearing. Employer did not register a number to participate in the hearing prior to the hearing and therefore did not participate in the hearing. Administrative notice was taken of claimant's unemployment insurance benefits records.

ISSUES:

Was claimant's appeal timely?

Was the separation a layoff, discharge for misconduct, or voluntary quit without good cause?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The unemployment insurance decision was mailed to the appellant's address of record on July 13, 2021. The appellant did not find out about the decision until she called IWD to inquire into the amount of her unemployment. The appeal was sent within ten days of communicating with IWD.

Claimant began working for employer in February 2020. Claimant last worked as a full-time production worker. Claimant was separated from employment on April 13, 2021, when she was terminated.

On April 13, 2021, after claimant's shift was over claimant was called into a meeting with Human Resources, Ashley Hanby, and claimant's supervisor, Melissa Musick. Claimant was notified that she had reached 10 points with regards to the employer's attendance policy. The employer informed claimant that they were starting the steps to terminated claimant. Claimant asked if

there was any way to save her job and Ms. Hanby replied: "No." The claimant turned in her badge and left.

The employer had an attendance policy that if an employee was absent then they would accumulate 1 point per absence. If an employee had a doctor's note then the point would be taken away. If an employee was late or left early they would accumulate ½ a point. If an employee reached 10 points then they would be terminated. Claimant acknowledges that she received the policy and that she knew about the policy.

Claimant received a verbal warning in February 2021 notifying her that she had reached 7 points. Claimant had to sign a document acknowledging she had 7 points. Claimant was notified on March 1, 2021, that a family member had died. The employer gives employees five days of bereavement time and allows employees to take additional time if they have accumulated vacation time. Claimant took her five days of bereavement and took additional vacation time. Claimant returned to work on March 11, 2021.

Claimant is unaware of any additional time that she missed and does not believe that the bereavement time and additional vacation time used for her bereavement caused her to accumulate more absentee points with the employer.

The employer was not present and did not present any evidence establishing additional missed days that caused claimant to accumulate absentee points.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellant's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the

representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The appellant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received. Without notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The claimant filed an appeal within a reasonable period of time after discovering the disqualification. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

The next issue to be determined is whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the claimant was discharged. For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant did not quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. *Voluntary quitting.* If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

While the employer has the burden to establish the separation was a voluntary quitting of employment rather than a discharge, claimant has the burden of proving that the voluntary leaving was for good cause attributable to the employer. Iowa Code § 96.6(2).

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

Iowa unemployment insurance law disqualifies claimants who voluntarily quit employment without good cause attributable to the employer or who are discharged for work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code §§ 96.5(1) and 96.5(2)a. A voluntary quitting of employment requires that an employee exercise a voluntary choice between remaining employed or terminating the employment relationship. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W.2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

In this case the claimant was called to Human Resources. During the meeting claimant was notified by the employer they were terminating claimant. Claimant asked if there was any way to preserve her employment and the employer told her no. Claimant did not voluntarily quit but was discharged by the employer since claimant did not have the option of continuing her employment with the employer. Since claimant was discharged it must be determined if claimant was

discharged for job related misconduct that would disqualify her from unemployment insurance benefits.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

Causes for disqualification.

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. *Discharge for misconduct.* If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) *Definition.*

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Reigelsberger v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993); *accord Lee v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Iowa 2000).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) *Report required.* The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) *Past acts of misconduct.* While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Misconduct “must be substantial” to justify the denial of unemployment benefits. Lee, 616 N.W.2d at 665 (citation omitted). “Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of benefits.” Id. (citation omitted). ...the definition of misconduct requires more than a “disregard” it requires a “carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)(a) (emphasis added).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit*, supra.

An employer’s no-fault absenteeism policy or point system is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits. The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of “unexcused” can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for “reasonable grounds,” *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not “properly reported,” holding excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper* at 10. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins*, supra.

The employer has not established that claimant had excessive absences which would be considered unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance eligibility. There was no evidence presented that established claimant had a recent absence that would disqualify her from receiving unemployment benefits. Since the employer has not established a current or final act

of misconduct, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The claimant's appeal is timely.

The July 13, 2021, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is REVERSED. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. Benefits withheld based upon this separation shall be paid to claimant.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Carly Smith". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first name "Carly" is connected to the last name "Smith".

Carly Smith
Administrative Law Judge
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau

November 05, 2021
Decision Dated and Mailed

cs/ol