IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

LAWRENCE HARLAND

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 09A-UI-10339-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

GRAHAM PACKAGING PLASTIC PRODUCTS INC

Employer

OC: 03/08/09

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quit Iowa Code Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Lawrence Harland filed an appeal from the March 30, 2009, reference 01, decision that denied. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on August 6, 2009. Mr. Harland participated. Barb Polglaze-Carter represented the employer. Department Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether there is good cause, as defined by the law, to deem Mr. Harland's late appeal timely.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Mr. Harland participated in the March 27, 2009 that resulted in the entry of the March 30, 2009, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. On March 30, 2009, Workforce Development mailed a copy of the reference 01, decision to Mr. Harland's last-known address of record. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by April 9, 2009. Mr. Harland received the decision in a timely manner, prior to the deadline for appeal. Due to personal health issues, Mr. Harland did not take steps to file an appeal until July 20, 2009. Mr. Harland did have one or more family members who might have been available to assist with the timely filing of an appeal or the filing of an appeal earlier than July 20. On July 20, 2009, Mr. Harland went to the Muscatine Workforce Development Center, completed an appeal form, and delivered the completed appeal form the Workforce Development Center staff. The appeal was then faxed to the Appeals Section, which received the appeal on July 20.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5. except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary guit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (lowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See 871 AC 24.35(1)(a). See also Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). See also Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Cedar Rapids v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See 871 IAC 24.35(1)(b).

The appeal in this matter was filed on July 20, 2009, when Mr. Harland delivered the completed appeal to the Muscatine Workforce Development Center staff.

The evidence in the record establishes that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that

there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal and could have enlisted help from family members or others to file a timely appeal.

No appeal shall be considered timely if the delay in filing was unreasonable, as determined by the division after considering the circumstances in the case. See 871 IAC 24.35(2)(c). The weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Harland could have enlisted help from family members or others to file an appeal much sooner than July 20, 2009. Despite the personal health issues and the hospitalization in June, the administrative law judge concludes that the length of the delay in filing the appeal was unreasonable.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the lowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Workforce Development error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service. See 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to lowa Code section 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (lowa 1979) and <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877 (lowa 1979).

DECISION:

The Agency representative's March 30, 2009, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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