IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

LINDA K ROSS

Claimant

APPEAL 19A-UI-03338-NM-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

BIOLIFE PLASMA LLC

Employer

OC: 03/31/19

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On April 22, 2019, the claimant filed an appeal from the April 19, 2019, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based on her discharge for excessive unexcused absenteeism and tardiness. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on May 10, 2019. Claimant participated and testified. Employer did not participate.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying, job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant began working for employer in November 2014. Claimant last worked as a full-time medical support specialist. Claimant was separated from employment on April 4, 2019, when she was discharged.

The employer has an attendance policy in place which calls for progressive discipline starting at six tardies. Employees are terminated at 13 tardies. Claimant was 30 minutes late to work on April 3 and April 4, 2019. Claimant's schedule changes from week to week and she misread her start times for the days in question. These tardies put claimant over 13 and she was discharged from employment. Claimant had received a final warning for her attendance approximately two months prior to her termination. That warning advised claimant further tardies would lead to her separation from employment. Claimant gave several reasons why she was late to work, including weather, migraines, and difficultly getting up and around due to depression. Claimant acknowledged approximately four tardies were because she was just running late. Claimant felt she was treated unfairly because she was not given a first written warning before she received her final written warning. Claimant also believed other employees were allowed to be tardy without consequence, though she acknowledged she did not have any first-hand information to support that belief.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. Gaborit, supra. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct

except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10.

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

An employer's point system or no-fault absenteeism policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits; however, an employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified as to when and why the employee is unable to report to work. Here, claimant was tardy at least four times just because she was running late in the morning. Claimant acknowledged she was warned that further tardies could result in termination of employment and she was tardy on April 3 and 4 because she misread her schedule. Like claimant's tardies because she was running late, this is an issue of personal responsibility and therefore is not excused. The final absence, in combination with the claimant's history of unexcused absenteeism, is considered excessive. Claimant had not provided sufficient information to support her claims that she was treated differently than other employees. Benefits are withheld.

DECISION:

The April 19, 2019, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment due to excessive, unexcused absenteeism. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Nicole Merrill Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	

nm/rvs