

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**JENE L GREIF**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 12A-UI-01350-LT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**WEST DES MOINES COMMUNITY SCHOOL  
DISTRICT**  
Employer

**OC: 01/01/12  
Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Claimant filed an appeal from the February 1, 2012 (reference 01) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on February 29, 2012. Claimant participated with union steward and bus driver Marlene Bright. Employer did not respond to the hearing notice instructions and did not participate.

**ISSUE:**

Did employer discharge claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a head custodian for 16 years at Western Hills Elementary School and was separated from employment on June 30, 2011. His last day of work was in May 2011. He was given the option to quit or face discharge because of engaging in sexually related banter with a teacher who had reciprocated in the past. He had no prior warnings of any nature or indication from the teacher the communication was unwelcome. There is no information about whether the teacher was disciplined for her part in the ongoing communication.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

871 IAC 24.26(21) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(21) The claimant was compelled to resign when given the choice of resigning or being discharged. This shall not be considered a voluntary leaving.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a cause of action for sexual harassment may be predicated on two types of harassment: (1) Harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and (2) harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive working environment. *Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson*, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986).

A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up

to or including discharge for the incident under its policy. The conduct for which claimant was discharged was misconduct, but inasmuch as the employer had not previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation and there had been no indication the communication was unwelcome as it had been reciprocated, the employer has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Furthermore, since there is no information that the teacher was disciplined in some manner for her participation, a disparate application of a policy cannot support a disqualification from benefits. Benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The February 1, 2012 (reference 01) decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed. The benefits withheld shall be paid, provided he is otherwise eligible.

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Dévon M. Lewis  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs