

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI**

**JANE A STONEBURNER
663 MAPLE ST
LEHIGH IA 50557-5011**

**TRINITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
ATTN: TED VAUGHN ACCOUNTING
802 KENYON RD
FT DODGE IA 50501**

**Appeal Number: 06A-UI-04438-DT
OC: 03/26/06 R: 01
Claimant: Respondent (1)**

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319**.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Trinity Regional Medical Center (claimant) appealed a representative's April 19, 2006 decision (reference 01) that concluded Jane A. Stoneburner (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 10, 2006. The claimant participated in the hearing. Ted Vaughn appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from two other witnesses, Jonette Terranova and Terry Daly. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on October 1, 1996. She worked full time as a cashier in the employer's hospital's food service department. Her last day of work was March 9, 2006. The employer discharged her on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was making too many errors.

On March 8, 2006, the claimant had rung two orders, one for \$8.79 and the other for \$8.89, together as a credit charge of \$8,798.89. She did not catch the error and void it out; it was discovered by the employer after the day's records were reconciled. The claimant could not recall the specific transaction when this occurred, but believed it must have happened when she was busy or distracted by someone asking a question while she was processing the transaction. She had not previously made this type of error without catching it and voiding it.

The claimant routinely had been making errors in properly counting out the \$250.00, which was to be left in the cash drawer at end of a normal workday; she had received warnings for these incorrect cash counts at least on March 8, July 21, and September 27, 2005. She received some retraining and was given a form to assist her, and so did not make further cash count errors until January 16, 2006, when she again miscounted the \$250.00 and was given another warning.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 1. The employer's interest, or
 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Henry, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is in essence unsatisfactory job performance. The mere fact that an employee might have various incidents of unsatisfactory job performance does not establish the necessary element of intent; misconduct connotes volition. A failure in job performance is not misconduct unless it is intentional. Huntoon, supra; Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). There is no evidence the claimant intentionally failed to catch the charge error, and it was not even the same type of error for which she had received warnings in the past. Under the circumstances of this case, the claimant's failure to catch the charge error was worst the result of inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence, or was a good faith error in judgment or discretion. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's April 19, 2006 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

ld/kkf