IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

CAMIL ZONIC 1010 ANSBROUGH AVE WATERLOO IA 50701

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC °/₀ TALX UC EXPRESS PO BOX 283 ST LOUIS MO 63166-0283

Appeal Number: 04A-UI-02735-DT

OC: 02/08/04 R: 03 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's March 4, 2004 decision (reference 01) that concluded Camil Zonic (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on April 27, 2004. The claimant participated in the hearing. Dave Duncan appeared on the employer's behalf. Aldijana Radoncic served as interpreter. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE: Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on March 19, 2002. He worked full time as an hourly production employee working on the B shift on the kill floor of the employer's Waterloo, lowa pork slaughter and processing facility. His last day of work was February 6, 2004. The employer suspended him that day and discharged him on February 9, 2004. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive safety violations in a 12-month period.

On February 13, 2003, the claimant was given a warning and suspension for failing to shut off power to a skinner when going on break. On September 6, 2003, he was given a warning and suspension for running on the production floor. On January 8, 2004, he was given a warning and suspension for shifting his hand skinner to his unprotected non-knife hand. For this incident, the claimant indicated that he had shifted the skinner from his cutting hand to his non-cutting hand because work was done and he was preparing to put the equipment away.

On February 6, 2004, near the end of the shift, the claimant was on his platform and was wearing his belted knife sheath. He understood he was finished, and took off the belt and hung it in the platform area. His supervisor then pointed out to him another piece of meat that needed to be cut off the carcass that was at his platform, so he turned back to his knife belt, took out the knife, and cut the piece of meat. He was given the final safety violation because of removing the knife from the sheath and moving it uncovered for the step between where the belt was hanging and the carcass. The employer's policies provide for discharge if there are four safety violations in a 12-month period.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Henry, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is his fourth safety violation in the 12-month period from February 13, 2003 through February 6, 2004. The mere fact that an employee might have various incidents of unsatisfactory job performance does not establish the necessary element of intent; misconduct connotes volition. A failure in job performance is not misconduct unless it is intentional. Huntoon, supra; Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). There is no evidence the claimant intentionally violated the policy regarding the sheathing of the knife. Under the circumstances of this case, the claimant's taking of the step with the unsheathed knife, at least on February 6, 2004, was the result of inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence, and was a good faith errors in judgment or discretion. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's March 4, 2004 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

ld/kjf