IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

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WILLIAM FAIRBANK ATTORNEY AT LAW STE 1200 317 – 6TH AVE DES MOINES IA 50309 Appeal Number: 05A-UI-11088-LT

OC: 10-02-05 R: 04 Claimant: Appellant (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.*

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Iowa Code § 96.5(1)d – Voluntary Leaving/Illness or Injury

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Claimant filed a timely appeal from the October 24, 2005, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on November 14, 2005. Claimant did participate. Employer did participate through Doreen Coppinger and was represented by William Fairbank, Attorney at Law. Employer's Exhibit 1 was received.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time short haul driver through August 15, 2005, when he was discharged for not returning to work from a medical leave by August 11, 2005. (Employer's Exhibit 1) Claimant sought treatment for vertigo, which was caused by an inner ear infection. During the diagnosis and treatment of the infection, claimant's physician determined he has

borderline diabetes and prescribed a pill to curb his appetite but did not require him to take insulin or monitor his blood sugar with a machine. He did speak to Doreen Coppinger on August 9 after his medical release was faxed to her and she said they had a load for him on August 10, 2005, which he took. He worked again on August 11 and took a load to St. Louis. After he delivered that load, employer contacted him to take another load to Joplin, Missouri, that same day. He asked for a rider to keep him company because he felt uneasy having just returned from medical leave, and Judy initially granted the request. Coppinger called back and denied the request since he had not worked the full 90-day probationary period. After some further delay, employer called him again and told him not to take to load and to return the truck. Jim Wilkins, safety director and human resources manager, spoke with claimant later on August 11 and instructed him to call Monday, August 15 and he would have another load. When he did so, Coppinger told him he was fired.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. <u>Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. <u>Miller v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa App. 1988).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as claimant did return to work on August 10 and 11, employer's reason for the separation is apparently pretextual since there were no further modifications to his medical release or ability to work. Simply expressing unease about taking a second trip in one day and requesting a rider at anytime during the probationary period is not grounds for disqualification.

DECISION:

The October 24, 2005, reference 01, decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/kjw