IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JAMES S IZZOLENA

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-12674-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

DEE ZEE INC

Employer

OC: 10/13/13

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

James Izzolena filed a timely appeal from the November 4, 2013, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on December 4, 2013. Mr. Izzolena did not respond to the hearing notice instructions to provide a telephone number for the hearing and did not participate. Lacey Leichliter represented the employer and presented additional testimony through Sarah Tew. Exhibits One through Five were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: James Izzolena was employed by Dee Zee, Inc., as a full-time forklift driver until June 26, 2013, when Sarah Tew, Human Resources Specialist, discharged him from the employment based on a positive drug test. The basis for the drug test was a workplace accident that occurred on May 24, 2013 and that Mr. Izzolena had brought to the attention of his supervisor on that same day. On June 18, 2013, the employer had Mr. Izzolena submit to what the employer deemed a post-accident drug test. On June 25, 2013, the employer received the result of the drug test, which was positive.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s) alone. The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also <u>Greene v. EAB</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. lowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (lowa 1976).

lowa Code Section 730.5 provides the authority under which a private sector employer doing business in Iowa may conduct drug or alcohol testing of employees. In <u>Eaton v Employment Appeal Board</u>, 602 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1999), the Supreme Court of Iowa considered the statute and held "that an illegal drug test cannot provide a basis to render an employee ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits." Thereafter, in <u>Harrison v. Employment Appeal Board</u>,

659 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 2003), the Iowa Supreme Court held that where an employer had not complied with the statutory requirements for the drug test, the test could not serve as a basis for disqualifying a claimant for benefits.

The weight of the evidence indicates that accident that prompted the drug test occurred on May 24, 2013 and was brought to the employer's attention that same day. The weight of the evidence indicates that a post-accident drug test was requested on June 18, 2013, 25 days after the accident came to the attention of the employer. See Exhibits Three and Two. After such delay, the drug test request and drug test itself could no longer be deemed a post-accident drug test and was unauthorized by lowa Code section 730.5. Accordingly, the drug test and drug test result cannot serve as a basis for a finding of misconduct or disqualification for benefits. Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Mr. Izzolena was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, Mr. Izzolena is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits.

DECISION:

The Agency representative's November 4, 2013, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/pjs