

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

GEROME C TRENT
Claimant

ADVANCE SERVICES INC
Employer

APPEAL 18A-UI-09554-DB-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

**OC: 08/26/18
Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting
Iowa Code § 96.5(1)j – Voluntary Quitting Temporary Employment
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant filed an appeal from the September 13, 2018 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits to the claimant based upon his separation from employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on October 16, 2018. The claimant participated personally. Witness Shiniece Trent participated on behalf of the claimant. The employer, Advance Services Inc., participated through witness Melissa Lewien. Employer's Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted. The administrative law judge took administrative notice of the claimant's unemployment insurance benefits records including the fact-finding documents.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?
Did claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to employer?
Did the claimant voluntarily quit by not reporting for an additional work assignment within three business days of the end of the last assignment?
Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?
Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

Claimant was employed as a temporary employee. The employer is a temporary employment firm. Claimant was placed at a job assignment with Jabil, working as an inspector. Claimant began his employment on Thursday, April 12, 2018 but only worked 0.2 hours in training that day. Claimant's supervisor with this employer was Cindy Ridinger.

Claimant's work schedule varied each week. One week he would work Sunday, Wednesday and Thursday. The following week he would work Monday, Tuesday, Friday and Saturday. He worked approximately twelve hours each day, except for April 12, 2018.

When claimant was hired by the employer he acknowledged reviewing the employer's three day no call no show policy and its attendance policy. See Exhibit 1. Claimant had access to the policies through his electronic employee portal.

The week of Sunday, April 29, 2018 through Saturday, May 5, 2018, claimant was scheduled to work on Sunday, April 29, 2018; Wednesday, May 2, 2018; and Thursday, May 3, 2018. Claimant worked on Sunday April 29, 2018 and on Wednesday, May 2, 2018. He did not work on Thursday, May 3, 2018, even though he was scheduled to work.

Claimant had informed Ms. Ridinger that he would be absent from work on Thursday, May 3, 2018 due to a trip to Minnesota with his family. Ms. Ridinger told claimant that he would receive a point for his absence on Thursday, May 3, 2018. This conversation occurred prior to May 3, 2018.

On Friday, May 4, 2018, Ms. Ridinger telephoned the claimant and told him that the job assignment had ended due to him failing to show up for work. Claimant had only missed one day of work on Thursday, May 3, 2018 at this point. On Tuesday, May 8, 2018, claimant contacted Ms. Ridinger to request additional work and no further assignments were available to the claimant. Claimant had received no discipline prior to his separation from employment.

Claimant has received benefits of \$2,457.00 between August 26, 2018 and October 13, 2018. Employer did participate in the fact-finding interview by telephone through witness Steve Volle.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge as follows:

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as

is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

After assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the Administrative Law Judge finds that claimant's testimony and Mrs. Trent's testimony are more credible than that of Ms. Lewien regarding what work schedule claimant was scheduled to work the week of Sunday April 29, 2018 through Saturday, May 5, 2018. Ms. Lewien testified that the employer paid its employees on a Monday through Sunday pay period. If claimant's only absence was on Thursday, May 3, 2018 and no other days, then there would have been at least one pay period with wages for five twelve-hour days on it, according to Ms. Lewien's testimony that employees were paid on a Monday through Sunday pay period. Ms. Lewien testified that the most hours claimant worked in one pay period was 34.75 hours. This information cannot be credible when reconciled with the fact that claimant only missed work on Thursday, May 3, 2018. Claimant's testimony as to what his scheduled working days were the week of Sunday April 29, 2018 through Saturday May 5, 2018 is more credible.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not

contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus of the administrative code definition of misconduct is on deliberate, intentional or culpable acts by the employee. *Id.* When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Further, poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Unemployment statutes should be interpreted liberally to achieve the legislative goal of minimizing the burden of involuntary unemployment." *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1982). The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Id.* at 11. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. *Id.* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989).

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). The requirement of “unexcused” can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for “reasonable grounds,” *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 or because it was not “properly reported.” *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (Iowa 1984) and *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). Excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). The term “absenteeism” also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as “tardiness.” An absence is an extended tardiness and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 190 (Iowa 1984). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping is not considered excused. *Id.* at 191. Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10-11 (Iowa 1982). Absences in good faith, for good cause, with appropriate notice, are not misconduct. *Id.* at 10. They may be grounds for discharge but not for disqualification of benefits because substantial disregard for the employer’s interest is not shown and this is essential to a finding of misconduct. *Id.*

Excessive absenteeism has been found when there has been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable. Two absences would be the minimum amount in order to determine whether these repeated acts were excessive. Further, in the cases of absenteeism it is the law, not the employer’s attendance policies, which determines whether absences are excused or unexcused. *Gaborit*, 743 N.W.2d at 557-58 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

Claimant was absent from work for one day, Thursday, May 3, 2018. He had informed his employer that he would be absent that day due to a planned family trip to Minnesota. As such, even though proper notification was given, this absence was unexcused. However, typically one unexcused absence is not considered excessive. Misconduct can be shown in a single absence case based on facts such as the nature of an employee’s work, the effect of the employee’s absence, dishonesty or falsification by the employee in regard to the unexcused absence, and whether the employee made any attempt to notify the employer of the absence. *Sallis v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d at 897. Here, there was no credible evidence presented that the single unexcused absence amounted to misconduct. As such, the employer has failed to prove that claimant engaged in any current act of job-related misconduct that would disqualify him from receiving benefits.

Further, Iowa Code § 96.5(1)j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. (1) The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and

who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

(2) To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

(3) For the purposes of this paragraph:

(a) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their workforce during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.

(b) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

Claimant contacted Ms. Ridinger within three working days of the notification of the end of the assignment, requested reassignment, and there was no work available, no disqualification is imposed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.5(1)j.

Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. Because benefits are allowed, the issue of overpayment is moot. The employer's account may be charged for benefits paid.

DECISION:

The September 13, 2018 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant's separation from employment is not disqualifying. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits paid.

Dawn Boucher
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

db/rvs