IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

## DELORES M WELLNITZ 1123 - 4<sup>TH</sup> ST SW MASON CITY IA 50401

### WOODHARBOR MOLDING & MILLWORK 3277 – 9<sup>™</sup> ST SW MASON CITY IA 50401

# Appeal Number:05A-UI-05795-H2TOC:05-01-05R:O202Claimant:Respondent(1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.* 

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

#### STATE CLEARLY

- 1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a - Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the May 25, 2005, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on June 22, 2005. The claimant did participate. The employer did participate through Lorie Nelson, Human Resources Assistant, and Robert Martin, Supervisor.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a general production worker full time beginning January 2, 2002 through April 20, 2005 when she was discharged. The claimant was discharged because she and a coworker Barry got into an argument on the production floor about some missing pieces

that the claimant needed in order to complete her assigned job duties. While other employees could see the two of them arguing no one was close enough to hear what was actually being said over the loud roar of the production floor. Barry's statement that the claimant used profanity when speaking to him and called him a vulgar name is not substantiated by any other witnesses. The claimant was only asking Barry to supply her with parts she needed to complete an order she was working on.

Other employees conclude that the claimant and Barry were yelling based on the hand gestures and facial expressions during the incident. Yelling and/or disruptive behavior is not permitted on the production floor. Barry was also discharged as a result of this incident.

The claimant was previously disciplined for similar conduct and behavior on June 11, 2004 through June 13, when she was suspended for a confrontation she had with another coworker, Jewel Hernandez. The claimant was given a written warning on December 5, 2003 for another disruptive confrontation with another coworker.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v.</u> <u>Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The employer discharged the claimant and has the burden of proof to show misconduct. Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. <u>Newman v.</u> <u>Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. <u>Miller v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

The employer's evidence does not establish that the claimant deliberately and intentionally acted in a manner she knew to be contrary to the employer's interests or standards. There was no wanton or willful disregard of the employer's standards. In short, substantial misconduct has not been established by the evidence. The employer has not met their burden of establishing misconduct. The claimant was the only participant of the discussion to testify. While the employer may have had good cause to discharge, conduct which might warrant a discharge from employment will not necessarily sustain a disqualification from job insurance benefits. Budding v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 337 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa App. 1983).

# DECISION:

The May 25, 2005, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

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