IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

MARY G HUNT 2674 GALENA DR DUBUQUE IA 52003

L A LEASING INC SEDONA STAFFING 612 VALLEY DR MOLINE IL 61265 Appeal Number: 04A-UI-09078-DT

OC: 07/18/04 R: 04 Claimant: Appellant (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

| (Administrative Law Judge) |
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| (Decision Dated & Mailed) |

Section 96.5-1-j – Temporary Employment 871 IAC 24.26(19) – Temporary Employment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Mary G. Hunt (claimant) appealed a representative's August 17, 2004 decision (reference 01) that concluded she was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from L.A. Leasing, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on September 15, 2004. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 04A-UI-09079-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Colleen McGuinty appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Nikki Keifer. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE: Was there a disqualifying separation from employment?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary staffing agency. The claimant began taking assignments through the employer's Dubuque, Iowa office in early September 2003. She was placed on a long-term assignment through the employer that began on September 11, 2003. She worked full time as an office administrator at the employer's municipal client through June 30, 2004. The assignment ended that date because the client deemed the assignment to be completed. The client informed the employer of the completion of the assignment on June 24, 2004. The claimant separately contacted the employer's Dubuque office manager on June 24 and again on June 30 to report the ending of the assignment. She indicated her interest in new assignments, and per the office manager's instructions, updated her resume with the employer on or about July 6.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The essential question in this case is whether there was a disqualifying separation from employment.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of lowa Code section 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of lowa Code section 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The intent of the statute is to avoid situations where a temporary assignment has ended and the claimant is unemployed, but the employer is unaware that the claimant is not working and could have been offered an available new assignment to avoid any liability for unemployment insurance benefits. Where a temporary employment assignment has ended and the employer is aware of the end of that assignment, the employer is already on "notice" that the assignment is ended and the claimant is available for a new assignment; where the claimant knows that the employer is aware of the ending of the assignment, he has good cause for not separately "notifying" the employer. The statute does not require that a claimant seek reassignment, it only requires that the employer have "notice" of the end of the assignment.

Here, the employer was aware that the client had ended the assignment; it considered the claimant's assignment to have been completed. Further, the claimant had personally reported the ending of the assignment on the end date, and had indicated interest in a new assignment. The separation is deemed to be completion of temporary assignment and not a voluntary leaving; a refusal of an offer of a new assignment would be a separate potentially disqualifying issue. Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The representative's August 17, 2004 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The claimant's separation was not a voluntary quit but was the completion of a temporary assignment. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

ld/pjs