

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

SCOTTY G INMAN

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 10A-UI-12592-DT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORP

Employer

OC: 08/01/10

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

Section 96.6-2 - Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Scotty G. Inman (claimant) appealed a representative's August 26, 2010 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 27, 2010. The claimant participated in the hearing. Jessica Sheppard appeared on the employer's behalf. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on August 26, 2010. The claimant received the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by September 5, 2010, a Sunday. The notice also provided that if the appeal date fell on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the appeal period was extended to the next working day, which in this case was Tuesday, September 7. The appeal was not treated as filed until it was postmarked in Des Moines on September 8, 2010, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The claimant had deposited the appeal into a United States Postal Service post office box in Ottumwa on or before September 5.

The claimant started working for the employer on November 9, 2009. He worked full time as second shift production worker in the employer's Ottumwa, Iowa, pork processing facility. His last day of work was July 26, 2010. The employer suspended him that day and discharged him on July 29, 2010. The reason asserted for the discharge was unsatisfactory job performance.

The employer had given the claimant several warnings for unsatisfactory job performance, including a final warning on July 9. Most of the claimant's warnings were for failing to wipe down condensation before putting the racks of pork bellies into the coolers. On July 26 the claimant was responsible for moving some additional racks of pork bellies into the coolers. However, two of the

coolers had recently been defrosted and were not yet down to temperature so they could be used for cooling the bellies. The remaining coolers were full. By the time sufficient space could be freed up in the operable coolers to move the new racks in, some of the bellies on the waiting racks had increased in temperature to the point where they no longer met safety standards. As a result of this final incident, the employer discharged the claimant.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision. Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides that unless the affected party (here, the claimant) files an appeal from the decision within ten calendar days, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied as set out by the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that the appellant's failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was due to error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2), or other factor outside of the claimant's control. The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal should be treated as timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See Beardslee, supra; Franklin, supra; and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits, an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission that was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is unsatisfactory job performance. The mere fact that an employee might have various incidents of unsatisfactory job performance does not establish the necessary element of intent; misconduct connotes volition. A failure in job performance is not misconduct unless it is intentional. Huntoon, supra; Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). There is no evidence the claimant intentionally failed to do something reasonably within his power to get the racks of bellies into available coolers before the temperature of the bellies increased. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's August 26, 2010 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The appeal in this case is treated as timely. The employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/kjw