IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

KATIE E KUPFERSCHMIDT

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 07A-UI-06936-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION

FRONTIER MGMT CORP

Employer

OC: 06/10/07 R: 04 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed a timely appeal from the July 2, 2007, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on July 31, 2007. Claimant participated with Sara Trowbridge and Rob Munter. Employer participated through Kara Helbing and Julie Witt.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full time guest service agent from (the prior company from September 2005) March 5, 2007 until June 11, 2007 when she was discharged. On June 10, 2007 claimant was out of uniform because she did not have her tie/scarf on because it was in another vehicle. On the same day Helbing asked claimant where her tie was, claimant countered asking Helbing where her nametag is. This was a first incident of a uniform violation. On April 11, 2007 claimant had a personal visitor for a half hour but did answer phone calls and help guests. On April 25, 2007, claimant mistakenly booked a room for a sold out weekend and resolved the issue with the customer, which later cancelled because the job was done in that area.

Sara Trowbridge had communications from other employees who had not worn the complete uniform but were not written up. Rob Munter had failed to wear his tie during one shift and was not disciplined.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a

"wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Employment Appeal Board*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the uniform issue, had allowed others to work out of uniform without any disciplinary action, and Helbing herself was not wearing a complete uniform, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently in violation of prior warning or an enforced policy. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written) and reasonable notice should be given and policies should be enforced across the board. Employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct and treated claimant disparately, accordingly, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

dml/pjs

The July 2, 2007, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no current disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed