

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

KAREN L WILLIAMS
Claimant

APPEAL 17A-UI-09640-NM-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

SCHUSTER GRAIN CO INC
Employer

OC: 08/27/17
Claimant: Respondent (1R)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting
Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the September 13, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on October 5, 2017. The claimant participated and testified. The employer participated through Director of Safety and Compliance Keith Lamfers.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as an over-the-road truck driver from August 4, 2016, until this employment ended on April 17, 2017, when she was discharged. Claimant was discharged by the employer because a temporary medical condition prevented her from being able to drive under Department of Transportation regulations. Claimant was not eligible for FMLA and did not have personal leave time to cover her absence. The employer does not offer any other form of leave, so claimant was discharged. Claimant has since been cleared to drive and was working for a new employer, Smithfield Hog Products, in Missouri, from May 30 to August 1, 2017, earning \$5,184.34 in gross wages.

The claimant filed a new claim for unemployment insurance benefits with an effective date of August 27, 2017. The claimant filed for and received a total of \$2,275.00 in unemployment

insurance benefits for the weeks between August 27 and September 30, 2017. Both the employer and the claimant participated in a fact finding interview regarding the separation on September 12, 2017. The fact finder determined claimant qualified for benefits.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant did not quit but was discharged for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5(1)d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(35) The claimant left because of illness or injury which was not caused or aggravated by the employment or pregnancy and failed to:

- (a) Obtain the advice of a licensed and practicing physician;
- (b) Obtain certification of release for work from a licensed and practicing physician;
- (c) Return to the employer and offer services upon recovery and certification for work by a licensed and practicing physician; or
- (d) Fully recover so that the claimant could perform all of the duties of the job.

The court in *Gilmore v. Empl. Appeal Bd.*, 695 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) noted that:

"Insofar as the Employment Security Law is not designed to provide health and disability insurance, only those employees who experience illness-induced separations that can fairly be attributed to the employer are properly eligible for unemployment benefits." *White v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 487 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1992) (citing *Butts v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 328 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1983)).

The statute provides an exception where:

The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and ... the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible. Iowa Code § 96.5(1)(d).

Section 96.5(1)(d) specifically requires that the employee has recovered from the illness or injury, and this recovery has been certified by a physician. The exception in section 96.5(1)(d) only applies when an employee is fully recovered and the employer has not held open the employee's position. *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 346; *Hedges v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 368 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); see also *Geiken v. Lutheran Home for the Aged Ass'n*, 468 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1991) (noting the full recovery standard of section 96.5(1)(d)).

In the present case, the evidence clearly shows Gilmore was not fully recovered from his injury until March 6, 2003. Gilmore is unable to show that he comes within the exception of section 96.5(1)(d). Therefore, because his injury was not connected to his employment, he is considered to have voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer, and is not entitled to unemployment ... benefits. See *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 345; *Shontz*, 248 N.W.2d at 91.

The Iowa Court of Appeals has informally interpreted the Iowa Code §96.5(1) subsection (d) exception not to require a claimant to return to the employer to offer services after a medical recovery if the employment has already been terminated. *Porazil v. IWD*, No. 3-408 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003).

Claimant was medically unable to work. The employer terminated the employment prior to her medical release to return to work based upon a calendar measurement rather than the treating physician's opinion. While claimant has since been released to return to work, the employer separated her from employment prior to that release being given. At that point the separation became involuntary and permanent and is considered a discharge from employment.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. A reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of the Iowa Employment Security Act. An employer's point system, no-fault absenteeism policy or leave policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness or injury cannot constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). In spite of claimant's ineligibility for FMLA and other leave period, because she was discharged due to her illness or injury and related ongoing medical treatment, no misconduct has been established and no disqualification is imposed. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible. As benefits are allowed, the issues of overpayment and participation are moot.

During the hearing, claimant indicated she had worked for an out of state employer following her separation from this employer. According to claimant she earned more than \$5,000.00 working for Smithfield Hog Products, though those wages do not appear in her wage record. As such, the issues of whether this employer can be relieved of benefits either on a combined wage claim or because claimant has requalified for benefits since her separation must be remanded to the benefits bureau for initial investigation and determination.

DECISION:

The September 13, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible. Any benefits claimed and withheld on this basis shall be paid. The issues of overpayment and participation are moot.

REMAND:

The unrecorded wage issue delineated in the findings of fact is remanded to the benefits bureau of Iowa Workforce Development for initial investigation and determination on the issues a possible combined wage claim, claimant's requalification for benefits, and the chargeability of this employer.

Nicole Merrill
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

nm/scn