BEFORE THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD Lucas State Office Building Fourth floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319

WILLIAM L JOHNS	: HEARING NUMBER: 09B-UI-05523	
Claimant,		
and	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD	
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORP		

Employer.

NOTICE

THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL unless (1) a request for a REHEARING is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within 20 days of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT IS FILED WITHIN 30 days of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

SECTION: 96.5-2-a

DECISION

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE ALLOWED I F OTHERWISE ELIGBILE

The claimant appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. A majority of the Appeal Board, one member dissenting, finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The Employment Appeal Board adopts and incorporates the administrative law judge's Findings of Fact as it own with the following addition:

The claimant was a long-term employee having begun his employment on April 13, 2009. (Tr. 3) He received sanitation training at the start of his employment as it related to food safety (Tr. 7) as well as

received a handbook regarding other company policies. Mr. Johns received several warnings for violating the employer's smoking rule throughout his employment. (Tr. 5)

The employer removed the urinals from the locker room. (Tr. 6, 8) But employees continued to relieve themselves in the shower stall as did Mr. Johns on March 13th. The employer never addressed this issue in the monthly safety meetings. (Tr. 8) In fact, another employee was merely warned, not terminated, for throwing used toilet tissue on the floor. (Tr. 8)

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2009) provides:

Discharge for Misconduct. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The Iowa Supreme court has accepted this definition as reflecting the intent of the legislature. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665, (Iowa 2000) (quoting Reigelsberger v. Employment Appeal Board, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. <u>Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

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Both parties agree that the claimant relieved himself in the shower stall. While the employer argues that he committed a 'gross safety violation' (Tr. 4), the claimant refutes this allegation testifying that he did not believe he was violating any food safety rules. The proximity of the shower stall and the food processing area were not close. Additionally, before the claimant could return to the food area, he had to pass through the sanitation area where both his hands and his boots were sanitized. (Tr. 7

Although the employer believed they had a urine smell in the locker room, there was no evidence that the employer ever addressed this concern in their monthly safety meetings or by posting signs that prohibited such behavior. Rather, the claimant provided unrefuted testimony that this was common practice among employees as a result of the employer's having removed the urinals in the locker room.

The claimant admitted that had he been warned against such behavior, he would have ceased this practice. The only reason he relieved himself in the locker room was because he feared returning late from his break if he'd gone to the restroom in the more remote area. (Tr. 7) While we certainly do not condone the claimant's behavior and recognize that the employer may have compelling business reasons to terminate the claimant, conduct that might warrant a discharge from employment will not necessarily sustain a disqualification from job insurance benefits. <u>Budding v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 337 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa App. 1983). At worst, we conclude that this was an isolated instance of poor judgment that didn't rise to the legal definition of misconduct.

DECISION:

The administrative law judge's decision dated May 6, 2009 is **REVERSED**. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, he is allowed benefits provided he is otherwise eligible.

John A. Peno

Elizabeth L. Seiser

AMG/ss

DISSENTING OPINION OF MONIQUE F. KUESTER:

I respectfully dissent from the majority decision of the Employment Appeal Board; I would affirm the decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety.

Monique F. Kuester

AMG/ss

A portion of the claimant's appeal to the Employment Appeal Board consisted of additional evidence which was not contained in the administrative file and which was not submitted to the administrative law judge. While the appeal and additional evidence (documents) were reviewed, the Employment Appeal Board, in its discretion, finds that the admission of the additional evidence is not warranted in reaching today's decision.

John A. Peno

Elizabeth L. Seiser

Monique F. Kuester

AMG/ss