IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

KALVIN BACHMAN Claimant

APPEAL 20A-UI-05679-JC-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

DGS-ACQUISITIONS LLC Employer

> OC: 04/19/20 Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview PL116-136, Sec. 2104 – Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant, DGS Acquisitions LLC., filed an appeal from the June 1, 2020 (reference 01) Iowa Workforce Development ("IWD") unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on July 6, 2020. The claimant was registered but did not pick up at the scheduled time when called twice. His voicemail was not set up. The employer participated through Crystal Anderson, store director.

The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct? Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived? Can any charges to the employer's account be waived? Is the claimant eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as an overnight lead worker and was separated from employment on April 14, 2020, when he was discharged for violation of the employer's attendance policy.

Employer has a written attendance policy which states an employee will receive a verbal and written warning for unexcused absences and upon three unexcused absences in a rolling six month period, an employee is subject to discharge (Employer Exhibit 1). Employer said

claimant was trained at the time of hire. Employer gave claimant a verbal warning but not a written warning for attendance before discharge. Employer did not have specific dates of warnings or unexcused absences. Employer stated the final absence occurred when claimant went into his shift and told his team he was leaving. He was subsequently discharged.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits in the amount of \$1,264.00, since filing a claim with an effective date of April 19, 2020. The administrative record also establishes that the employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview or make a witness with direct knowledge available for rebuttal. Employer did not receive the anticipated phone call but was waiting for it on May 29, 2020.

The claimant also received federal unemployment insurance benefits through Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC). Claimant received \$4,800.00 in federal benefits for the eight- week period ending June 27, 2020.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible.

lowa unemployment insurance law disqualifies individuals who are discharged from employment for misconduct from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a. They remain disqualified until such time as they requalify for benefits by working and earning insured wages ten times their weekly benefit amount. *Id*.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

In the specific context of absenteeism the administrative code provides:

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

871 IAC 24.32(7); See Higgins v. IDJS, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190 n. 1 (Iowa 1984)("rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law").

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence.

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10(Iowa 1982). Second, the unexcused absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Employment Appeal Bd*, 437 N.W.2d 895, 897 (Iowa 1989).

In order to show misconduct due to absenteeism, the employer must establish the claimant had excessive absences that were unexcused. Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the absences were unexcused. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness are excused, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Iowa Admin. Code* r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit, supra*.

In this case, the employer has a written policy which states an employee will be given a verbal and written warning for attendance before discharge. The employer did not follow its policy and discharged the claimant before giving him a written warning. The employer could not furnish any details of any incidents or warnings to corroborate its allegation of misconduct. Based on the evidence presented, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was not put on proper notice that his job was in jeopardy in accordance with the employer's written policy. Inasmuch as the employer had not previously warned the claimant about the issue leading to the separation per its policy, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that the claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. Training or general notice to staff about a policy is not considered a disciplinary warning. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given.

The question before the administrative law judge in this case is not whether the employer has the right to discharge this employee, but whether the claimant's discharge is disqualifying under the provisions of the Iowa Employment Security Law. While the decision to terminate the claimant may have been a sound decision from a management viewpoint, for the above stated reasons, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not sustained its burden of proof in establishing that the claimant's discharge was due to job related misconduct according to Iowa law. Accordingly, benefits are allowed provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Because the claimant is eligible for benefits, the issues of overpayment and relief of charges are moot.

PL116-136, Sec. 2104 provides, in pertinent part:

(b) Provisions of Agreement

(1) Federal pandemic unemployment compensation.--Any agreement under this section shall provide that the State agency of the State will make payments of regular compensation to individuals in amounts and to the extent that they would be determined if the State law of the State were applied, with respect to any week for which the individual is (disregarding this section) otherwise entitled under the State law to receive regular compensation, as if such State law had been modified in a manner such that the amount of regular compensation (including dependents' allowances) payable for any week shall be equal to

(A) the amount determined under the State law (before the application of this paragraph), plus

(B) an additional amount of \$600 (in this section referred to as "Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation").

(f) Fraud and Overpayments

. . . .

(2) Repayment.--In the case of individuals who have received amounts of Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation to which they were not entitled, the State shall require such individuals to repay the amounts of such Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation to the State agency...

Because this decision has determined the claimant is qualified to receive regular benefits, he is eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) if he meets all other requirements. (The employer would not be charged for FPUC.)

DECISION:

The June 1, 2020 (reference 01) initial decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. Claimant is also eligible for FPUC, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Jenniger &. Beckman

Jennifer L. Beckman Administrative Law Judge Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau Iowa Workforce Development 1000 East Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209 Fax 515-478-3528

July 14, 2020 Decision Dated and Mailed

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