IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

 68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

 RYAN G DAVIS

 APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-08396-H2T

 Claimant

 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

 DECISION

 HY-VEE INC

 Employer
 OC: 05-22-11

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a - Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the June 16, 2011, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on July 18, 2011. The claimant did participate. The employer did participate through Greg Wery, Store Director and Bonny Bell, Director of Safety and Security and was represented by Alice Rose Thatch of Corporate Cost Control.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged due to job related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a product specialist full time beginning July 21, 2006 through May 26, 2011 when he was discharged. The claimant was discharged for alleged theft of \$1,580.00 from the employer on May 7, 2011. The claimant denies taking the money. The employer refused to provide the name of the employee who allegedly witnessed the claimant in the office with the zippered money bag in his hand.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial."

If a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to do, it may be fairly inferred that other evidence would lay open deficiencies in that party's case. <u>Crosser v. Iowa department of Public Safety</u>, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). The employer refused to even provide the name of the employee who allegedly witnessed the claimant in the office where the money was kept or who saw the claimant with the money bag in his hand. The employer's evidence simply does not meet their burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Since the employer has not met their burden of proof, benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The June 16, 2011 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Teresa K. Hillary Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

tkh/pjs