IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

TIFFANEE L HAWTHORNE

Claimant

APPEAL 19A-UI-08704-DB-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY REST INC

Employer

OC: 10/13/19

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quitting

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer/appellant filed an appeal from the October 28, 2019 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed unemployment insurance benefits to the claimant based upon her discharge from work. On December 3, 2019, a default decision was issued when the appellant failed to appear for the hearing that was scheduled on December 2, 2019. On December 18, 2019, the administrative law judge issued an order to reopen the record and a telephone hearing was rescheduled for December 31, 2019. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on December 31, 2019. The claimant, Tiffanee L. Hawthorne, did not participate. The employer, The Cheesecake Factory Rest Inc., participated through witnesses Renee Blanco and Angelynn Anderson. The administrative law judge took official notice of the claimant's unemployment insurance benefits records including the fact-finding documents.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Did claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to employer?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed part-time as a server at the employer's restaurant. She began working for this employer on October 13, 2015 and her employment ended on September 27, 2019. Her job duties included serving customers who were dining at the restaurant. Her immediate supervisors were Angelynn Anderson and Leslie Anderson.

The separation from employment occurred when the employer voluntarily terminated the claimant. The employer had considered the claimant to have voluntarily quit for three consecutive no-call/no-shows on September 10, 11, and 12, 2019; however, claimant's last day worked on the job was September 15, 2019.

Claimant became ill and was in the hospital. Someone notified the employer that the claimant was in the hospital. Ms. Anderson did not know if the claimant contacted the employer after she was discharged from the hospital. The employer has no written policy stating that three consecutive no-call/no-shows will be considered a voluntary quitting of employment.

Claimant's administrative records establish that she has received benefits of \$3,560.00 for the eleven weeks between October 13, 2019 and December 28, 2019. The employer did not participate by telephone in the fact finding interview; however, it provided information and documentation in its statement of protest which stated that the claimant was considered to have voluntarily quit for three consecutive no-call/no-shows. No written policy regarding three consecutive no-call/no-shows was provided in the documentation to the fact-finding interviewer.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes as follows:

Iowa Code §96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an

intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the lowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

First, it must be determined whether claimant quit or was discharged from employment. A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

Another person notified the employer that the claimant was in the hospital and could not work, as such, this does not establish that the claimant had any intention to quit. Further, Ms. Anderson testified that the three consecutive no-call/no-shows that the employer was using as its basis for the claimant manifesting an intention to quit occurred prior to her last day that she physically worked on the job. Claimant clearly did not have an intent to voluntarily quit if she continued to work after her absences. As such, the credible evidence establishes that the claimant did not voluntarily quit and was discharged for attendance.

Because claimant was discharged from employment, the burden of proof falls to the employer to establish that claimant was discharged for job-related misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, the employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation.

Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 743 N.W.2d 554 (lowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Id.* at 558.

Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. lowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (lowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (lowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (lowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (lowa 1982). The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 or because it was not "properly reported." *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (lowa 1984) and *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (lowa 1982). Excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (lowa 1982).

The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 190 (lowa 1984). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping is not considered excused. *Id.* at 191. Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10-11 (lowa 1982). Absences in good faith, for good cause, with appropriate notice, are not misconduct. *Id.* at 10. They may be grounds for discharge but not for disqualification of benefits because substantial disregard for the employer's interest is not shown and this is essential to a finding of misconduct. *Id.*

Claimant was discharged because she was absent from work while in the hospital. Claimant had another person notify the employer that she was in the hospital. Her absences were due to personal illness and the employer was notified of the absences, as such, they are considered excused absences. The employer failed to meets its' burden of proof to establish disqualifying job-related misconduct that would result in disqualification. As such, benefits are allowed. Because benefits are allowed, the issue of overpayment is moot. The employer may be charged for benefits paid.

DECISION:

The October 28, 2019 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Dawn Boucher	
Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	

db/scn