

IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

WESLEY WIDNER
124½ GAY STREET
MANCHESTER IA 52057

ADECCO USA INC
C/O FRICK UC EXPRESS
P O BOX 66736
ST LOUIS MO 63166-6736

Appeal Number: 04A-UI-02560-ET
OC: 08-24-03 R: 04
Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319**.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the February 26, 2004, reference 02, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call before Administrative Law Judge Julie Elder on March 29, 2004. The claimant did not respond to the hearing notice and did not participate in the hearing. Allison Rushford, Office Supervisor, and Frank Eckert, Employer's Representative, participated in the hearing on behalf of the employer.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a full-time finisher for Adecco USA, last assigned at Exide Technologies from September 16, 2003 to February 4, 2004. On January 6, 2004, the claimant called and reported he would not be in because was ill. On February 3, 2004, he called the employer and said he would not be in because there had been a large snowfall and his car was buried in the street. The employer asked him to try to come in but the claimant did not work that day and the employer terminated his employment on February 4, 2004, because of his attendance. The claimant did not seek further work from the employer.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proving disqualifying job misconduct. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). The claimant missed two days of work in four and one-half months of employment. Although the claimant could have made more of an effort to get to work on February 3, 2004, the administrative law judge does not find two absences, one of which was due to illness, to constitute excessive unexcused absenteeism. Consequently, benefits are allowed.

The employer also argued that the claimant should be disqualified from receiving benefits because he did not contact it for another assignment within 48 hours of the completion of his assignment with Exide Technologies.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

(1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.

(2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of Iowa Code section 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of Iowa Code section 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The purpose of the statute is to provide notice to the temporary agency employer that the claimant is available for work at the conclusion of the temporary assignment. In this case, the employer had notice of the claimant's availability because it terminated his assignment. The issue of a refusal of suitable work is adjudicated when the former employer makes an offer of work. In this case, Adecco has made no offer of work to the claimant. Additionally, Iowa law allows three days for an employee to call in, rather than the employer's stated 48 hours, and the employer has not established that its written notification of its policy requiring employees to call in for work is contained on a document separate from the contract of employment in compliance with Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j.

DECISION:

The February 26, 2004, reference 02, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

je/d