# BEFORE THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD Lucas State Office Building

Lucas State Office Building Fourth floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319

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WILLIAM P CHIAFOS

: **HEARING NUMBER:** 17BUI-09921

Claimant

and : **EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD** 

: DECISION

F & B CAB COMPANY

Employer :

# NOTICE

**THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL** unless (1) a **request for a REHEARING** is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within **20 days** of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a **PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT** IS FILED WITHIN **30 days** of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

**SECTION: 96.5-2-A** 

#### DECISION

## **UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE ALLOWED IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE**

The Claimant appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. A majority of the Appeal Board, one member dissenting, finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The majority of the Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

## **FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact are adopted by the Board as its own with the exception of the last sentence of the second to the last paragraph. In addition the Board makes the following findings:

On the final day the Employer responded to the Claimant "If you don't have enough money you can't charge. The deal is you get your check you pay me and you can charge. That's it." During his last ride the Claimant was under the mistaken impression that the driver was willing to give him a ride home *gratis*. The Claimant had received free rides before. The driver in question gave him a ride home in response to the Claimant's request for a ride. The Employer's cabs do not necessarily use a meter. The Claimant misunderstood during the ride and thought he was not going to be charged by this driver. The driver did not request payment after dropping off the Claimant and the Claimant indicated he would "catch him later" in the sense of see the individual at some non-specified time in the future. That night the owner watched video of the Claimant's departure and then the next day the owner contacted the

driver to ask him about the circumstances of the ride.

### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2017) provides:

*Discharge for Misconduct*. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

"This is the meaning which has been given the term in other jurisdictions under similar statutes, and we believe it accurately reflects the intent of the legislature." *Huntoon v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d, 445, 448 (lowa 1979).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

It is the duty of the Board as the ultimate trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The Board, as the finder of fact, may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, as well as the weight to give other evidence, a Board member should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In determining the facts, and deciding what evidence to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and

consistent with other evidence the Board believes; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). The Board also gives weight to the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge concerning credibility and weight of evidence, particularly where the hearing is in-person, although the Board is not bound by that opinion. Iowa Code §17A.10(3); *Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission*, 322 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Iowa 1982). The findings of fact show how we have resolved the disputed factual issues in this case. We have carefully weighed the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the evidence considering the applicable factors listed above, and the Board's collective common sense and experience. We have found credible the Claimant's description of his conduct on the final day, and also find credible his description of the cab ride, of his understanding of the terms of that ride, and of the actions of the cab driver who gave him that ride.

On his final day the Claimant was left in a position where he had no way to get home. He had planned on using the charging system. During his shift his supervisor revoked this authority. If this revocation applied immediately this would leave the Claimant with no way home. The Claimant then requested a ride home rather than dispatching it. He assumed it would be for free, as he had done in the past. He did not clarify with the driver the terms of the ride offered, and he thus assumed it was meant to be free when it was not. Under these circumstances it was not a willful and wanton disregard of the employer's interests for the Claimant to take that last ride home without sufficient clarification of the terms. This decision was not a smart one. It was indeed very poor judgment. In the end, however, we find that the Claimant's actions were an error of judgment in a single isolated circumstance. Generally isolated instances of poor judgment are not misconduct. *Kelly v. IDJS*, 386 N.W.2d 552, 555 (lowa App.1986)

We note, as we have often done, that "[m]isconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of benefits." *Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665 (lowa 2000); *Sellers v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (lowa Ct.App.1995); *Reigelsberger v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (lowa 1993); *Breithaupt v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 453 N.W.2d 532, 535 (lowa Ct.App.1990); *Budding v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 337 N.W.2d 219, 222 (lowa App. 1983); *Irving v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 883 NW 2d 179, 201 (lowa 2016). This case falls within that rule. We understand why the Claimant was discharged but do not find that the Employer has proven this reason sufficient to disqualify the Claimant.

#### **DECISION:**

The administrative law judge's decision dated October 27, 2017 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the Claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, benefits are allowed provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible.

Ashley R. Koopmans

James M. Strohman

DISSENTING	OPINION	OF KIM D	SCHMETT:
DISSENTING	OPINION	OF KIIVI D.	SCHIVIE I I .

I respectfully	dissent from	the majority	decision	of the	<b>Employment</b>	Appeal	Board; I	would	affirm	the
decision of th	ne administrati	ve law judge	in its ent	irety.						

Kim D. Schmett

RRA/fnv