# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

TODD C GILL

Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 10A-UI-15155-H2T** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

**E I DU PONT NEMOURS & CO INC** 

Employer

OC: 09-12-10

Claimant: RESPONDENT (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the October 26, 2010, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on December 15, 2010. The claimant did participate. The employer did participate through (representative) Roger Keller, Human Resources Manager; Ryan Maus, Site Technical Manager; John Hellige, Operations Manager and Jerry Pollpeter, Maintenance Manager. Claimant's Exhibit A was entered and received into the record. Employer's Exhibit One was entered and received into the record.

#### ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged due to job related misconduct?

## **FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a manufacturing technical engineer full time beginning July 1, 2004 through September 10, 2010 when he was discharged. The claimant was discharged for allegedly not working at least 40 hours per week. The employer's records are not accurate when based on electronic or manual gate logs. At least ten weeks are missing from the 2009 calculations. The claimant was never told that he had to illustrate through the employer's electronic or manual gate log that he was at the plant 40 hours per week. The claimant regularly and routinely worked off site as part of his job duties which would not show up on the electronic gate logs. The claimant alleges that he was routinely working over 40 hours per week.

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

## Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

## 871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial."

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The administrative law judge is simply not persuaded that the claimant was not working at least a minimum of 40 hours per week. The claimant was never warned that his job was in jeopardy or that he had to have card swipes in the electronic or manual system show a minimum of 40 hours per week.

Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about any of the issues leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed.

#### **DECISION:**

The October 26, 2010 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Teresa K. Hillary
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

tkh/pjs