IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - El

PAUL M MURRY Claimant	APPEAL NO. 07A-UI-06145-DT
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
TEAM STAFFING SOLUTIONS INC Employer	

OC: 05/06/07 R: 03 Claimant: Appellant (2/R)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.5-1 – Voluntary Leaving

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Paul M. Murry (claimant) appealed a representative's June 12, 2007 decision (reference 02) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Team Staffing Solutions, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on July 9, 2007. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 07A-UI-06146-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Sarah Fiedler appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary employment firm. The claimant began an assignment with the employer's warehousing business client on August 14, 2006. His last day physically working on the assignment was March 18, 2007.

The claimant was off work for approximately a week ending February 23, 2007, due to a lower back problem for which he saw the employer's workers' compensation physician. He saw the doctor on a follow-up visit on March 16, 2007, at which time he reported continued pain in his left shoulder. As a result of this further symptom, the claimant was placed on light duty work restrictions. As the employer's business client was not in a position to provide work to comply with those restrictions, the employer provided the claimant with some internal client light-duty work. His last day of the light duty work was April 30.

On April 30 both the claimant and the employer were informed that the employer's workers' compensation carrier had determined that the claimant's medical condition was not work-related. As a result of this determination and of the fact that the claimant was still under

light duty work restrictions from the doctor, the warehousing business client informed the claimant and the employer that it was ending the claimant's assignment. Further, the employer advised the claimant that since the claimant's condition had been deemed not to be work-related, it would no longer provide him the internal light duty work; the employer informed the claimant that it would be unable to place him in additional positions until he was released for full duty with no restrictions.

The most recent doctor's note was provided to the employer on May 4, which released the claimant, who is right-handed, for work but restricted him to no use of his left arm. As this was not a full release without restriction, the employer indicated it would be unable to place the claimant into further positions unless or until a full release with no restrictions was provided.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits if he quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer or was discharged for work-connected misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.25 provides that, in general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. A voluntary quit is a termination of employment initiated by the employee – where the employee has taken the action which directly results in the separation; a discharge is a termination of employment initiated by the employer – where the employer has taken the action which directly results in the separation; a discharge is a termination of employment initiated by the employer – where the employer has taken the action which directly results in the separation from employment. 871 IAC 24.1(113)(b), (c). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. Bartelt v. Employment Appeal Board, 494 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1993). The employer asserted that the claimant was not discharged but that he quit by not providing a full release without restriction. The claimant has not demonstrated an intent to quit; rather, the determination to end the employment was made by the employer. The administrative law judge concludes that the employer has failed to satisfy its burden that the claimant voluntarily quit. Iowa Code § 96.6-2. As the separation was not a voluntary quit, it must be treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment insurance. 871 IAC 24.26(21).

The issue in this case is then whether the employer effectively discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:

a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or

b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or

- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The reason the employer effectively discharged the claimant was his failure to provide a full release without restriction. While the employer may have had a good business reason for ending its employment of the claimant, it has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

An issue as to whether the claimant is sufficiently able and available to perform some work arose during the hearing. This issue was not included in the notice of hearing for this case, and the case will be remanded for an investigation and preliminary determination on that issue. 871 IAC 26.14(5).

DECISION:

The representative's June 12, 2007 decision (reference 02) is reversed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit and the employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible. The matter is remanded to the Claims Section for investigation and determination of the able and available issue.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/kjw