IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

DANIEL E CHIA 6100 WELKER AVE DES MOINES IA 50312

K MART CORP

c/o TALX UC EXPRESS
PO BOX 283
ST LOUIS MO 63166-0283

Appeal Number: 05A-UI-00182-DT

OC: 11/21/04 R: 02 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)
,
(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

K Mart Corporation (employer) appealed a representative's December 21, 2004 decision (reference 01) that concluded Daniel E. Chia (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on January 27, 2005. The claimant participated in the hearing. Chad Sellers appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on January 29, 1998. He worked full time as an area manager in one of the employer's Des Moines, Iowa stores. His last day of work was November 18, 2004. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was allegations of inappropriate conduct.

On September 29, 2004, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission forwarded a complaint regarding the claimant from a former employee to the employer; on October 11, 2004 the employer's legal department forwarded the complaint to the district office covering Des Moines with instructions to investigate. On November 10 Mr. Sellers, that district manager for loss prevention, informed the claimant of the complaint and interviewed him and other employees. As a result of the investigation, the claimant was discharged on November 18.

The complaint received by the employer was from a former employee, and alleged that most recently in mid-July 2004 the claimant had hugged and put his hand or arm on the complainant's hip or back, and had further made comments about what type of underwear the complainant was wearing. Another employee, a friend of the former employee, had made a similar complaint to the store manager also in late July; that complaint was investigated in August but had not been substantiated. The claimant denied any inappropriate contact; he acknowledged that he occasionally gave employees hugs or put his arm on their shoulders, but only in a fraternal or paternal manner. He acknowledged that he occasionally commented to some of the female employees that he could see their underwear showing above their pants, but indicated he did so to remind them to cover themselves. The former employee who complained had been discharged by the claimant the night she alleged he had been inappropriate towards her; she had previously told the claimant that she knew how to get back at people who wronged her.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

<u>Henry</u>, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is the allegation of inappropriate conduct towards some employees. First, the claimant denied any inappropriate conduct. No first-hand witness was available at the hearing to provide testimony to the contrary under oath and subject to cross-examination. The employer relies exclusively on the second-hand accounts; without that information being provided first-hand, the administrative law judge is unable to ascertain the complainants were credible, or whether the employer's witnesses might have misinterpreted or misunderstood aspects of their reports. Some evidence was presented which would suggest at least the one complainant had motive to provide a false statement against the claimant. Under the circumstances, the administrative law judge finds the

claimant's first-hand information more credible. While the claimant's reference to being able to see some employees' underwear might have been better handled as more formal disciplinary warnings toward the employees, under the circumstances of this case, the claimant's comments were the result of inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence, and was a good faith error in judgment or discretion.

Secondly, even if the allegations of the complaint had been established, there was no current act of misconduct as required to establish work-connected misconduct. 871 IAC 24.32(8); Greene v. Employment Appeal Board, 426 N.W.2d 659 (lowa App. 1988). The most recent incident in question occurred almost four months prior to the employer's discharge of the claimant, and almost a month passed between the time the employer was on notice of the complaint and when the claimant was placed on notice that there was an investigation and that his job was in jeopardy. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's December 21, 2004 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

ld/pjs