

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JACOB D ZIEMAN
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-01158-LT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

**IOWA WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT**

**OC: 10/30/11
Claimant: Appellant (1)**

Iowa Code § 96.3(4) – Determination of Benefits
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.9(1)b – Monetary Determination – Timeliness
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant appealed from the December 27, 2012 corrected monetary record. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on February 26, 2013. The claimant participated. Department's Exhibit D-1 was admitted to the record.

ISSUE:

Is the claimant's appeal from the monetary determination timely?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A corrected monetary record was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on December 27, 2012. The claimant received the record. The record contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section within ten days of the date of mailing. The appeal was not filed until January 29, 2013, which is after the expiration of the ten-day appeal period.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall

commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

Iowa Code section 96.3-4 provides:

4. Determination of benefits. With respect to benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 1983, an eligible individual's weekly benefit amount for a week of total unemployment shall be an amount equal to the following fractions of the individual's total wages in insured work paid during that quarter of the individual's base period in which such total wages were highest; the director shall determine annually a maximum weekly benefit amount equal to the following percentages, to vary with the number of dependents, of the statewide average weekly wage paid to employees in insured work which shall be effective the first day of the first full week in July:

If the number of dependents is:	The weekly benefit amount shall equal the following fraction of high quarter wages:	Subject to the following maximum percentage of the statewide average weekly wage.
0	1/23	53%
1	1/22	55%
2	1/21	57%
3	1/20	60%
4 or more	1/19	65%

The maximum weekly benefit amount, if not a multiple of one dollar shall be rounded to the lower multiple of one dollar. However, until such time as sixty-five percent of the statewide average weekly wage exceeds one hundred ninety dollars, the maximum weekly benefit amounts shall be determined using the statewide average weekly wage computed on the basis of wages reported for calendar year 1981. As used in this section "dependent" means dependent as defined in section 422.12, subsection 1, paragraph "c", as if the individual claimant was a taxpayer, except that an individual claimant's

nonworking spouse shall be deemed to be a dependent under this section. "Nonworking spouse" means a spouse who does not earn more than one hundred twenty dollars in gross wages in one week.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.9(1)b provides: Determination of benefit rights.

24.9(1) Monetary determinations.

b. The monetary record shall constitute a final decision unless newly discovered facts which affect the validity of the original determination or a written request for reconsideration is filed by the individual within ten days of the date of the mailing of the monetary record specifying the grounds of objection to the monetary record.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976). This would apply to the date of the monetary record as well.

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from determinations within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

DECISION:

The December 27, 2012 corrected monetary determination is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely and the monetary determination remains in full force and effect.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs