

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**JENNIFER L FISH**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO: 18A-UI-09106-JC-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**LUTHERAN SERVICES IN IOWA INC**  
Employer

**OC: 08/05/18**  
**Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct  
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment  
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed an appeal from the August 27, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on September 19, 2018. The claimant did not respond to the notice of hearing to furnish a phone number with the Appeals Bureau and did not participate in the hearing. The employer participated through Katie Schell, program coordinator. Employer Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

**ISSUES:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?  
Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?  
Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a care coordinator and was separated from employment on August 6, 2018, when she was discharged.

The employer's business provides services to at-risk families, including those involved in the court system or dealing with other governmental agencies. The employer has a policy which requires employees notify the employer immediately of any arrest or conviction that occurs, and the claimant was trained on this upon hire (Employer Exhibit 1).

The undisputed evidence is the claimant was allegedly involved in breaking and entering into the home of her ex-boyfriend on June 28, 2018. The ex-boyfriend was also an employee's nephew. The employee reported to the employer on June 29, 2018 that she heard about the incident. The employer asked the claimant on June 29, 2018 if there was a warrant out for her

arrest. She said no. The claimant was then placed on a paid suspension. On July 3, 2018, the employer was contacted by law enforcement in Black Hawk County, alerting of a potential warrant for the claimant's arrest. The employer moved the claimant to an unpaid suspension status.

The employer witness, Katie Schell, did not know when the warrant was issued, if the claimant was arrested or incarcerated, if charges were filed, what charges were filed, or the disposition of any charges. Ms. Schell, was then advised on August 3, 2018, by her human resources department, to prepare a termination letter, based upon information the employer had received. Ms. Schell did not know what information was received which triggered discharge.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits in the amount of \$1,240.00, since filing a claim with an effective date of August 5, 2018. The administrative record also establishes that the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview or make a witness with direct knowledge available for rebuttal. Katie Schell participated.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

In an at-will employment environment, an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

Under the definition of misconduct for purposes of unemployment benefit disqualification, the conduct in question must be "work-connected." *Diggs v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 478 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). The court has concluded that some off-duty conduct can have the requisite element of work connection. *Kleidosty v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 482 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 1992). Under similar definitions of misconduct, for an employer to show that the employee's off-duty activities rise to the level of misconduct in connection with the employment, the employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's conduct (1) had some nexus with the work; (2) resulted in some harm to the employer's interest, and (3) was conduct which was (a) violative of some code of behavior impliedly contracted between employer and employee, and (b) done with intent or knowledge that the employer's interest would suffer. See also, *Dray v. Director*, 930 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996); *In re Kotrba*, 418 N.W.2d 313 (SD 1988), quoting *Nelson v. Dept of Emp't Security*, 655 P.2d 242 (WA 1982); 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation §§ 77-78.

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of

misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

In this case, the claimant was suspended and subsequently discharged for conduct which allegedly occurred on June 28, 2018, off-duty. The administrative law judge is persuaded, based on the claimant's job duties and the employer's policies, that an employee convicted of certain crimes, even off duty, could be discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct. However, in this case, the employer could not furnish any details related to a warrant, arrest, incarceration, charges or conviction for which the claimant was discharged. Nor could the employer identify the reason the claimant was discharged effective August 3, 2018, after being on a leave of absence/suspension on June 29, 2018. No police report or public record confirming such allegations was provided for the hearing. Disqualifying conduct cannot be predicated on a mere arrest unsupported by a conviction or other credible evidence of the claimant's intentional conduct. *Irving v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 883 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 2016) (citing *In re Benjamin*, 572 N.Y.S.2d 970, 972 (App. Div. 1991)(per curiam)). Here, it is unclear if the claimant was ever arrested or convicted, based on the limited evidence presented by the employer.

The question before the administrative law judge in this case is not whether the employer has the right to discharge this employee, but whether the claimant's discharge is disqualifying under the provisions of the Iowa Employment Security Law. While the decision to terminate the claimant may have been a sound decision from a management viewpoint, for the above stated reasons, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not sustained its burden of proof in establishing that the claimant's discharge was due to a final or current act of job related misconduct. Accordingly, benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Because the claimant is eligible for benefits, the issues of overpayment and relief of charges are moot.

**DECISION:**

The August 27, 2018, (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

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Jennifer L. Beckman  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn