

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

CHRISTOPHER J PECK
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 08A-UI-02751-LT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

K MART CORP
Employer

**OC: 01/20/08 R: 01
Claimant: Appellant (4)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Leaving - Requalification
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the March 3, 2008, reference 02, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on April 7, 2008. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Kristy Parde and Theresa Berry. Department's Exhibit D-1 was received.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant's appeal is timely and if he has requalified for benefits since the separation.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A disqualification decision was mailed to claimant's last-known address of record on March 3, 2008. He did receive the decision within a week and before the overpayment decision dated March 14, 2008. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 13, 2008. The appeal was not filed until March 20, 2008, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

During the course of the hearing, the administrative law judge found evidence that since the December 8, 2007 separation from K-Mart, claimant has requalified for benefits by earning \$2,913.00 in insured wages with TRACO as of March 1, 2008.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow the administrative law judge concludes claimant's appeal is untimely but he has otherwise requalified for benefits.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. The administrative law judge concludes that the failure to file a timely appeal within the time

prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law *was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service* pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-g provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

g. The individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer under circumstances which did or would disqualify the individual for benefits, except as provided in paragraph "a" of this subsection but, subsequent to the leaving, the individual worked in and was paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Although claimant's appeal is untimely and removes jurisdiction for determining whether the reasons for the separation are disqualifying, the administrative law judge can determine requalification at any point in a claim. Since evidence in the administrative record reveals that the claimant has requalified for benefits since the separation from this employer. Accordingly, benefits are allowed and the account of the employer (account number 006482) shall not be charged.

DECISION:

The March 3, 2008, reference 02, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect, however the claimant has requalified for benefits effective March 1, 2008, provided he is otherwise eligible. The account of this employer shall not be charged.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/css