IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

NYANYLUP PADIET Claimant

APPEAL 18A-UI-04017-NM-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

SWIFT PORK COMPANY

Employer

OC: 02/25/18 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the March 26, 2018, (reference 04) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based on her discharge for violation of a known company rule. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on April 24, 2018. The claimant participated and testified with the assistance of a Dinka interpreter from CTS Language Link. The employer participated through Emily Pottorff, assistant human resource manager. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 5 were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as a general laborer from April 30, 2017, until this employment ended on February 21, 2018, when she was discharged.

The employer has a points-based attendance policy in place. Employees are terminated once they reach nine points. Employees are issued one point for absences in which they call more than 30 minutes prior to the start of their shift and two points if they are absent and do not call. Claimant received a copy of this policy, located in the employee handbook, upon her hire.

From the time of her hire until the time of her separation, claimant accumulated 14 attendance points. (Exhibit 3). According to the employer's records, ten on those absences were identified as being due to illness, one on December 26, 2017 no reason was given, another on January 23, 2018 was due to car problems, and one on February 20, 2018 was a no-call/no-show. Pottorff testified that although one of claimant's absences, on February 19, 2018, was coded as being due to illness, claimant was actually absent from work because she had been the victim of a robbery two days prior. Claimant agreed with this and testified she was absent from work on February 19 and 20 because her work id badge was stolen in the robbery and she did not believe she would be allowed to work without her badge. Claimant disagreed, however,

that she was a no-call/no-show on February 20 and testified she called to report her absence at approximately 2:00 p.m. for her shift starting at 4:30 p.m. The February 20, 2018 absence was the final absence prior to termination.

Pottorff testified, prior to claimant's termination, on January 25, 2018, she advised claimant that if she accumulated any additional attendance points she would be discharged from employment. Claimant denied this conversation occurred or that she was ever told her job was in jeopardy due to her attendance. The conversation was not documented and no written disciplinary action was issued. The employer submitted an email exchange between members of the human resource team, occurring on January 25, 2018, in which another member of the team asked Pottorff about claimant's points and a possible last chance agreement, but the exchange gives no indication as to whether this was actually discussed with the claimant. (Exhibit 4).

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such Misconduct as the term is used in the worker's contract of employment. disgualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit*, supra.

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra.*

An employer's no-fault absenteeism policy or point system is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits. A properly reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of Iowa Employment Security Law because it is not volitional. Excessive absences are not necessarily unexcused. Absences must be both excessive and unexcused to result in a finding of misconduct. A failure to report to work without notification to the employer is generally considered an unexcused absence. However, one unexcused absence is not disqualifying since it does not meet the excessiveness standard.

An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. The employer contends claimant was warned about her attendance and advised her job was in jeopardy on January 25, 2018. The claimant denied this conversation occurred or that she was ever told her job was in jeopardy due to her attendance. It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide

the facts in issue. Arndt v. City of LeClaire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. State v. Holtz, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.*. In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id*.

After assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, reviewing the exhibits submitted by the parties, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds the employer has not provided credible testimony showing claimant was given warning her job was in jeopardy. The testimony of the two witnesses is conflicting on this point. While the employer's exhibits show another member of the human resource team asked Pottorff about claimant's points and a possible last chance agreement, there was no evidence provided showing Pottorff, or any member of the human resource team, in turn discussed these issues with the claimant. Inasmuch as employer has not met its burden and cannot show it previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has failed to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The March 26, 2018, (reference 04) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. Benefits withheld based upon this separation shall be paid to claimant.

Nicole Merrill Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

nm/rvs