BEFORE THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD Lucas State Office Building Fourth floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319

:

JANELLE N MOORE

HEARING NUMBER: 09B-UI-06160

Claimant,

.

and

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD

DECISION

CDS GLOBAL INC

Employer.

NOTICE

THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL unless (1) a request for a REHEARING is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within 20 days of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT IS FILED WITHIN 30 days of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within 30 days of the date of the denial.

SECTION: 96.5-2-a

DECISION

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE DENIED

The employer appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. A majority of the Appeal Board, one member dissenting, finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The majority of the Employment Appeal Board REVERSES as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Janelle Moore (Claimant) worked as a full-time customer service representative for CDS Global, Inc. (Employer) from August 18, 2008 until the date of her discharge on March 27, 2009. (Tran at p. 2). When a customer is eligible for a certain offer, called a SMART offer, a screen pops-up on the representative's computer. (Tran at p. 3). The representative is required to read this verbiage to the customer as an attempt to upsell. (Tran at p. 3; Ex. 1. p. 3; p. 5; p. 8-11; p. 14; p. 19). The Claimant had told the employer she was uncomfortable with making the SMART offers. (Tran at p. 3; Ex. 1, p. 1; p. 10; p. 19). The Claimant had been repeatedly told that the SMART offer was a job requirement. (Tran at p. 3; p. 4; Ex. 1, p. 3; p. 5; p. 8-11; p. 19). The Claimant nevertheless refused to do it because she didn't think it was a necessary part of the service. (Tran at p. 3). Although the Claimant was a skilled employee her refusal to use the SMART system resulted in her being unable to meet sales

percentages. (Tran at p. 2-3; p. 4). When warned the Claimant's figures would improve for a while but then they would drop off again. (Tran at p. 4-5).

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2009) provides:

Discharge for Misconduct. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

"This is the meaning which has been given the term in other jurisdictions under similar statutes, and we believe it accurately reflects the intent of the legislature." <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d, 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

More specifically, continued failure to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. <u>See Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Company</u>, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa App. 1990). An employee's failure to perform a specific task may not constitute misconduct if such failure is in good faith or for good cause. <u>See Woods v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 327 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa 1982). Willful misconduct

can be established where an employee manifests an intent to disobey a future reasonable instruction of his employer. "[W]illful misconduct can be established where an employee manifests an intent to disobey the

reasonable instructions of his employer." Myers v. IDJS, 373 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Iowa 1983)(quoting Sturniolo v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 19 Cmwlth. 475, 338 A.2d 794, 796 (1975)); Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). The Board must analyze situations involving alleged insubordination by evaluating the reasonableness of the employer's request in light of the circumstances, along with the worker's reason for non-compliance. See Endicott v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 367 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). Good faith under this standard is not determined by the Petitioner's subjective understanding. Good faith is measured by an objective standard of reasonableness. "The key question is what a reasonable person would have believed under the circumstances." Aalbers v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 431 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Iowa 1988); accord O'Brien v. EAB, 494 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1993)(objective good faith is test in quits for good cause).

The record establishes that the Claimant simply refused to make the SMART offer. The Employer was under contract to make this offer to every eligible customer. The Claimant knew this and was told she was required to make the offer. She didn't do it because she didn't like to. This is insubordination. Despite her positive qualities the Claimant was unable to make the goals because of her refusal to consistently make the SMART offer. That this was intentional is bolstered by the Claimant's ability to improve after being warned, followed by relapses. The Employer has proved that the Claimant engaged in intentional disregard of the Employer's substantial interests by her refusal to follow instructions.

Finally, since the Administrative Law Judge allowed benefits and in so doing affirmed a decision of the claims representative the Claimant falls under the double affirmance rule:

871 IAC 23.43(3) Rule of two affirmances.

- a. Whenever an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative or the employment appeal board of the Iowa department of inspections and appeals affirms the decision of an administrative law judge, allowing payment of benefits, such benefits shall be paid regardless of any further appeal.
- b. However, if the decision is subsequently reversed by higher authority:
 - (1) The protesting employer involved shall have all charges removed for all payments made on such claim.
 - (2) All payments to the claimant will cease as of the date of the reversed decision unless the claimant is otherwise eligible.
 - (3) No overpayment shall accrue to the claimant because of payment made prior to the reversal of the decision.

Thus the Employer's account may not be charged for any benefits paid so far to the Claimant for the weeks in question.

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RRA/fnv

The administrative law judge's decision dated May 19, 2009 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the Claimant was discharged for disqualifying misconduct. Accordingly, she is denied benefits until such time the Claimant has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the Claimant's weekly benefit amount, provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible. See, Iowa Code section 96.5(2)" a".

No remand for determination of overpayment need be made under the double affirmance rule, 871 IAC 23.43(3), but still the Employer's account may not be charged.

	Elizabeth L. Seiser
RRA/fnv	Monique F. Kuester
DISSENTING OPINION OF JOHN A. PENO: I respectfully dissent from the majority decision of the decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety.	e Employment Appeal Board; I would affirm
decision of the administrative law judge in its entirety.	John A. Peno