IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

MISTY D PENDERGRAFT 900 BOUNDARY ST RED OAK IA 51566

PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES INC 512 N 4TH ST RED OAK IA 51566 Appeal Number: 05A-UI-11702-DT

OC: 11/16/05 R: 01 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board*, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

 (Administrative Law Judge)
,
(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.7-2-a(2) – Charges Against Employer's Account

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Professional Resources, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's November 7, 2005 decision (reference 01) that concluded Misty D. Pendergraft (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on December 5, 2005. The claimant failed to respond to the hearing notice and provide a telephone number at which she could be reached for the hearing and did not participate in the hearing. Monica Bartlett appeared on the employer's behalf. During the hearing, Employer's Exhibits One through Nine were entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments

of the employer, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary employment firm. The claimant's first and only assignment with the employer began on September 11, 2005. Her last day on the assignment was October 6, 2005. The assignment ended because of attendance and work performance issues.

The employer has a policy where an employee who incurs more than three points in a rolling 90-day period is subject to discharge. Points are assessed both for absences and for work issues.

The claimant had been assessed one point for leaving work after only 15 minutes on September 26, 2005; she was assessed a half point for calling off work on September 27, 2005. She was given another point for calling off work on October 4, 2005. She was therefore at 2.5 points. The employer does not track the reasons for the absences and acknowledged some or all of the absences could have been due to illness.

On October 6 the business client reported that in addition to missing too much work, the claimant was not keeping busy, doing a poor job, and was "not aggressive enough for factory labor." There was no information regarding when or what the final incident might have been. The claimant commented that she had never been spoken to before about her work performance, and that she had folded boxes when she was not otherwise busy. As a result of this report by the business client, another point was assessed, bringing the claimant to 3.5 points, resulting in discharge.

The claimant established an unemployment insurance benefit year effective October 16, 2005.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code §96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

<u>Henry</u>, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is her attendance and work performance. Excessive unexcused absences can constitute misconduct, however, in

order to establish the necessary element of intent, the absences must be both excessive and unexcused. <u>Cosper</u>, supra; <u>Higgins v. IDJS</u>, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline for the absence under its attendance policy. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Here, the employer cannot establish that the absences would be considered unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance benefit eligibility. Further, a failure in job performance is not misconduct unless it is intentional. <u>Huntoon</u>, supra. There is no evidence the claimant intentionally failed to work to the business client's expectations. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

The final issue is whether the employer's account is subject to charge. An employer's account is only chargeable if the employer is a base period employer. Iowa Code Section 96.7. The base period is "the period beginning with the first day of the five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual's benefit year and ending with the last day of the next to the last completed calendar quarter immediately preceding the date on which the individual filed a valid claim." Iowa Code Section 96.19-3. The claimant's base period began July 1, 2004 and ended June 30, 2005. The employer did not employ the claimant during this time, and therefore the employer is not currently a base period employer and its account is not currently chargeable for benefits paid to the claimant.

DECISION:

The representative's November 7, 2005 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account is not subject to charge in the current benefit year.

ld/s