

**BEFORE THE  
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD  
Lucas State Office Building  
Fourth floor  
Des Moines, Iowa 50319**

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**EUNICE P RENDON**

Claimant,

and

**HCM INC**

Employer.

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**HEARING NUMBER: 11B-UI-10830**

**EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD  
DECISION**

**NOTICE**

**THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL** unless (1) a **request for a REHEARING** is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within **20 days** of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a **PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT IS FILED WITHIN 30 days** of the date of the Board's decision.

A **REHEARING REQUEST** shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

**SECTION: 96.5-2-A**

**DECISION**

**UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE DENIED**

The Employer appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. The Appeal Board finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

The Employment Appeal Board adopts and incorporates as its own the administrative law judge's Findings of Fact.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2009) provides:

*Discharge for Misconduct.* If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

*Misconduct* is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The Iowa Supreme court has accepted this definition as reflecting the intent of the legislature. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665, (Iowa 2000) (quoting Reigelsberger v. Employment Appeal Board, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993)).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

The Claimant was a short-term employee having accumulated four written warning in short period of time. In addition, the Claimant failed to participate in the hearing to refute any of the Employer's testimony. The final act that led to her termination was her disrespectfulness toward a resident, which by all accounts further established a pattern of "...carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability...or [shows] an intentional and substantial disregard of the Employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the Employer..." 871 IAC 24.32(1)"a". For this reason, we conclude that the Employer satisfied their burden of proof.

Finally, since the Administrative Law Judge allowed benefits and in so doing affirmed a decision of the claims representative the Claimant falls under the double affirmance rule:

871 Rule of two affirmances. IAC 23.43(3)

- a. Whenever an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative or the employment appeal board of the Iowa department of inspections and appeals affirms the decision of an administrative law judge, allowing payment of benefits, such benefits shall be paid regardless of any further appeal.

b. However, if the decision is subsequently reversed by higher authority:

- (1) The protesting employer involved shall have all charges removed for all payments made on such claim.
- (2) All payments to the claimant will cease as of the date of the reversed decision unless the claimant is otherwise eligible.
- (3) No overpayment shall accrue to the claimant because of payment made prior to the reversal of the decision.

Thus the Employer's account may not be charged for any benefits paid so far to the Claimant for the weeks in question, but the Claimant will not be required to repay benefits already received.

**DECISION:**

The administrative law judge's decision dated September 16, 2011 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the Claimant was discharged for disqualifying misconduct. Accordingly, she is denied benefits until such time she has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. See, Iowa Code section 96.5(2)"a".

No remand for determination of overpayment need be made under the double affirmance rule, 871 IAC 23.43(3), but still the Employer's account may not be charged.

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John A. Peno

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Elizabeth L. Seiser

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Monique F. Kuester

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