IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

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NCS PEARSON INC

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Appeal Number: 05A-UI-04038-LT

OC: 03-06-05 R: 03 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319*.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Iowa Code §96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Employer filed a timely appeal from the April 7, 2005, reference 03, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on May 6, 2005. Claimant did participate with Louann Sloan. Employer did participate through Tiffany McDougal, Tony Wright, Lori Sherman and Sheila Zeithamel and was represented by Andrew Coffey, in house counsel for employer. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 4 were received.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a temporary full-time customer service representative (CSR) through March 10, 2005 when he was discharged for allegedly using the default AUX code too often on March 9, 2005. (Employer's Exhibit 2) When a CSR hits the AUX button without a

corresponding number the phone goes into auxiliary default state, which does not allow incoming calls. Employer issued a final written warning February 8, 2005, and advised claimant his job was in jeopardy for using the medical AUX code too frequently for issues related to his diabetes medications which requires him to urinate frequently. (Employer's Exhibit 1) Employer did not warn claimant on February 8 to reduce the amount of default or ACW (after call work) time. Thereafter, claimant reduced the use of his medical AUX time. Tiffani McDougall e-mailed claimant one time after the February 8 warning to notify him on March 3, 2005 he was in default AUX mode but did not advise him this was a problem or that he was subject to discipline if he did it again. (Employer's Exhibit 3, numbered fax page 51 for March 3, 2005)

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. <u>Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Employment Appeal Board, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa App. 1988).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the default or ACW AUX codes and it, not the medical code use, was the final reason leading to the separation, employer has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. It was not and benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The April 7, 2005, reference 03, decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/pjs