

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

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**LAWRENCE S WIDGER**  
Claimant

**BROWNS CREW CAR OF WYOMING INC**  
Employer

**APPEAL 14A-UI-02035-LT**  
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**OC: 01/05/14**  
**Claimant: Appellant (2)**

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Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct  
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant filed an appeal from the January 29, 2014, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon a discharge from employment. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held beginning on March 17, 2014, and completed on March 20, 2014. Claimant participated with former employee Christina Davis. Employer participated through employee relations manager Kristen Branson and human resource assistant Bryant Hunter. Claimant's Exhibits were not received as they were not relevant to the reasons for the separation.

**ISSUES:**

Is the appeal timely?  
Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job related misconduct?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant faxed his appeal on February 5, 2014 from the Council Bluffs, IowaWorks office. The Appeals Bureau did not receive it. Claimant checked back about the status of his appeal on February 24, and filed again the same day.

Claimant was employed full-time as a location supervisor and was separated from employment on January 7, 2014. On January 7, when he reported for his regular 3 p.m. shift, manager Susan Koncz asked him to rest for three hours and fill a multi-purpose vehicle (MPV) shift from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. He declined because he had worked the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift on January 6, had been awake since 6:30 a.m. for personal business and would not be safe to drive because of regulations that require ten hours of rest following 12 or more hours of duty. Location supervisors are required to be available to cover shifts for crew members. The employer had not previously warned claimant his job was in jeopardy for any similar reasons.

Davis was fired the day before for a similar reason. Lenzini told her that he was also going to fire the claimant and referred to him as "the guy with the cane." Lenzini started as manager of

that location in December 2013. The employer offered no first hand testimony about the reasons for the separation.

**REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the claimant's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The claimant filed an appeal in a timely manner but it was not received. Immediately upon receipt of information to that effect, a second appeal was filed. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co.*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); however, "Balky and argumentative" conduct is not necessarily disqualifying. *City of Des Moines v. Picray*, (No. \_\_\_-\_\_\_, Iowa Ct. App. filed \_\_\_, 1986).

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't Human Servs.*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608.

The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that if a party has the power to produce more explicit and direct evidence than it chooses to present, the administrative law judge may infer that evidence not presented would reveal deficiencies in the party's case. *Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the ruling in *Crosser, id.*, and noting that the claimant presented direct, first-hand testimony while the employer relied upon second-hand witnesses, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's recollection of the events is more credible than that of the employer.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy. The conduct for which claimant was discharged was an isolated incident of unavailability and inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed.

**DECISION:**

The January 29, 2014, (reference 01) decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed. The benefits withheld shall be paid, provided he is otherwise eligible.

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Dévon M. Lewis  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs

**NOTE TO EMPLOYER:**

If you wish to change the address of record, please access your account at: <https://www.myiowaui.org/UITIPTaxWeb/>.

Helpful information about using this site may be found at:

<http://www.iowaworkforce.org/ui/uiemployers.htm> and

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpCM8FGQoY>