

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**KEEGAN D BRIMM**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 10A-UI-17130-JTT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**RYAN RYCHNOVSKY**  
Employer

**OC: 05/02/10**  
**Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Section 96.5(3) – Work Refusal  
Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed an appeal from the November 22, 2010, reference 04, decision that allowed benefits based on an Agency conclusion that the claimant did not accept an offer of employment on May 11, 2010 because the work was not suitable. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on January 25, 2011. Ryan Rychnovsky represented the employer. On January 10, the claimant submitted written notice that he would not be making himself available for the appeal hearing. Department Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were received into evidence.

**ISSUE:**

Whether there is good cause to treat the employer's late appeal from the November 22, 2010, reference 04, decision as a timely appeal.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: On November 22, 2010, Workforce Development mailed a copy of the November 22, 2010, reference 04, decision to the employer at the employer's last known address of record. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by December 2, 2010. The decision arrived at the employer's address of record in a timely manner, prior to the deadline for appeal. The employer did not immediately open the correspondence, but instead delayed two or more weeks before opening the correspondence. The employer submitted its appeal by mail on December 16, 2010. The Appeals Section received the appeal on December 17, 2010.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See 871 AC 24.35(1)(a). See also Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See 871 IAC 24.35(1)(b).

The appeal was filed on December 16, 2010, two weeks beyond the December 2, 2010 deadline. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid.

Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that the appellant's failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service. See 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

**DECISION:**

The Agency representative's November 22, 2010, reference 04, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

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James E. Timberland  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/kjw