

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

SHAWN M KEETER

Claimant

APPEAL 19A-UI-08623-JC-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

PLAZA LANES PLEASANT HILL

Employer

OC: 09/15/19

Claimant: Appellant (4)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting
Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant, Shawn M. Keeter, filed an appeal from the October 18, 2019 (reference 07) Iowa Workforce Development (“IWD”) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 25, 2019. The hearing was held jointly with Appeal 19A-UI-08624-JC-T. The claimant participated. The employer, Plaza Lanes Pleasant Hill, participated through Clint Papin, food and beverage director.

The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records. Department Exhibit D-1 was admitted. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Is the appeal timely?

Did the claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to the employer?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a cook beginning in late August 2019 and was separated from employment on September 17, 2019, after tendering his resignation.

The claimant worked for this employer for less than one month. At the time of hire, he was informed he would be paid \$15.00 per hour. He was paid \$15.00 during his employment. When interviewed, he was also informed that he would be a cook with potential of becoming an assistant manager. The claimant thought he was doing more than just cook duties and was being underpaid. The claimant last worked on September 13, 2019. He was a no-call/no-show on September 16, 2019. The employer contacted the claimant in response to the no-call/no-show and the claimant informed the employer he was bringing in his notice. The claimant's resignation was effective September 17, 2019 and he intended to work until September 30,

2019. The employer elected to discharge the claimant on September 17, 2019 rather than have him work out his resignation period.

An initial decision (reference 07) was mailed to the claimant's address of record on October 18, 2019 which denied benefits based upon separation. The decision contained a warning that any appeal must be filed by October 28, 2019. The claimant did not receive the initial decision in the mail. He first learned of the unfavorable decision by way of the overpayment decision (Reference 09) which was mailed on October 22, 2019. When he visited IWD on October 28, 2019, he was not provided a copy of the reference 07 decision or told an appeal to it was due that day. He filed a timely appeal to the overpayment and at the same time, also appealed the unfavorable separation decision at issue here (Department Exhibit D-1).

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant's appeal is timely.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides, in pertinent part:

Filing – determination – appeal.

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2) provides:

Date of submission and extension of time for payments and notices.

(2) The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the division that the delay in submission was due to division error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service.

a. For submission that is not within the statutory or regulatory period to be considered timely, the interested party must submit a written explanation setting forth the circumstances of the delay.

b. The division shall designate personnel who are to decide whether an extension of time shall be granted.

c. No submission shall be considered timely if the delay in filing was unreasonable, as determined by the department after considering the circumstances in the case.

d. If submission is not considered timely, although the interested party contends that the delay was due to division error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States postal service, the division shall issue an appealable decision to the interested party.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received. Without notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The claimant timely appealed the overpayment decision, which was the first notice of disqualification. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant voluntarily left the employment without good cause attributable to the employer, but was discharged for no disqualifying reason prior to the intended resignation date.

Iowa Code section 96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an

intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The claimant has the burden of proof to establish he quit with good cause attributable to the employer, according to Iowa law. "Good cause" for leaving employment must be that which is reasonable to the average person, not the overly sensitive individual or the claimant in particular. *Uniweld Products v. Industrial Relations Commission*, 277 So.2d 827 (Fla. App. 1973). Ordinarily, "good cause" is derived from the facts of each case keeping in mind the public policy stated in Iowa Code section 96.2. *O'Brien v. EAB*, 494 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1993)(citing *Wiese v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 389 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 1986)). "The term encompasses real circumstances, adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason, just grounds for the action, and always the element of good faith." *Wiese v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 389 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 1986) "[C]ommon sense and prudence must be exercised in evaluating all of the circumstances that lead to an employee's quit in order to attribute the cause for the termination." *Id.*

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* After assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds the weight of the evidence in the record establishes claimant has not met his burden of proof to establish he quit for good cause reasons within Iowa law.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(13) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(13) The claimant left because of dissatisfaction with the wages but knew the rate of pay when hired.

The credible evidence presented is the claimant was hired as a cook and agreed to be paid \$15.00 per hour. He was paid \$15.00 per hour until he separated a couple weeks into

employment. The claimant may have felt he was entitled to higher pay but that administrative law judge is persuaded he was aware of wages at the time of hire. The claimant's decision to quit over a dissatisfaction with pay was not a good cause reason attributable to the employer.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(38) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(38) Where the claimant gave the employer an advance notice of resignation which caused the employer to discharge the claimant prior to the proposed date of resignation, no disqualification shall be imposed from the last day of work until the proposed date of resignation; however, benefits will be denied effective the proposed date of resignation.

The claimant tendered his resignation effective September 17, 2019 but was not allowed to work out the resignation period. Because the discharge was in response to a resignation notice no misconduct is established. Since the employer terminated the employment relationship in advance of the resignation notice effective date, the claimant is entitled to benefits from the date of termination September 17, 2019, until the effective date of the proposed resignation, September 30, 2019.

DECISION:

The October 18, 2019, (reference 07) decision is modified in favor of the claimant/appellant. The appeal is timely. The claimant voluntarily left the employment without good cause attributable to the employer, but was discharged prior to the resignation effective date. Benefits are allowed until September 30, 2019. Thereafter, benefits are withheld until such time as the claimant works in and has been paid wages equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount.

Jennifer L. Beckman
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Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn