IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

HAROLD R SMITH 1309 DORENE BLVD CARTER LAKE IA 51510

HARVEYS BR MANAGEMENT CO INC HARVEYS CASINO RESORTS 2701 – 23RD AVE COUNCIL BLUFFS IA 51501 Appeal Number: 04A-UI-03392-LT OC 02-29-04 R 01

Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319*.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)	
(Decision Dated & Mailed)	

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Employer filed a timely appeal from the March 19, 2004, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on April 16, 2004. Claimant did participate. Employer did participate through Annette Kesner and Lonnie Wilson.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time safety officer May 16, 1998 through February 17, 2004 when he was discharged. On February 14, 2004, the traffic in and out of the casino was busy and claimant was stationed at an entrance/exit consisting of three doors. He was responsible for traffic going in and out of the casino at each of the doors. No one else was stationed there with

him but there are normally two guards there. He allowed two minors (under age 21) into the casino, each one alternating with an adult as a group. Later another safety officer noticed them upstairs and verified their ages as 18 and 19. There is no written policy governing minors in the casino but they are allowed in to watch racing but are not allowed in certain other areas of the casino. A supervisor, Cesar Randa, acknowledged there should have been more than one guard on the door because it was busy.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the

carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. Newman v. <u>lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. <u>Miller v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa App. 1988).

Employer's policy of requiring identification of age from patrons under the age of 30 when entering the casino is too subjective. If employer wants its employees to decide with certainty whether or not to ID a customer entering the casino, with two different legal age requirements and areas of appropriate entrance, it possibly should have its employees ID all customers entering the premises. While the conduct may have warranted discharge according to employer's expectations, there was no evidence of wrongful intent or a pattern of negligence and it did not rise to the level of disqualification. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The March 19, 2004, reference 01, decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/b