

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

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**ANTOINETTE SAMAYOA**  
Claimant

**APPEAL 18A-UI-06178-NM-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**TARGET CORPORATION**  
Employer

**OC: 05/06/18  
Claimant: Respondent (2)**

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Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct  
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment  
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed an appeal from the May 25, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on June 22, 2018. The claimant participated and testified. The employer participated through Hearing Representative Dave Peterson and Store Team Leader Annette LeGree. Carol Jensen and Carmell Cook were also present on behalf of the employer, but did not testify. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 6 were received into evidence. Official notice was taken of the administrative record.

**ISSUES:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as an executive team leader from October 8, 2017, until this employment ended on May 8, 2018, when she was discharged.

On May 5 and 6, 2018, the claimant was working as the lead on duty (LOD) responsible for closing the store. (Exhibit 3). One of the job duties of the closing LOD is to ensure all doors are locked for the evening. Another job duty is to ensure three separate alarms, one for the parameter, one for the receiving room, and another for the cash safe, are armed. LeGree testified claimant was trained on these procedures upon her hire.

On May 5 and 6, 2018, the doors to the shipping dock were left unlocked and on May 5 the alarm for the receiving room was never armed. Both actions left the store at risk for theft. As the LOD these nights, claimant was responsible for ensuring all doors, including the shipping dock, were locked and the alarms were armed. On March 14, 2018, claimant received disciplinary action for failing to lock the main entrances to the store at closing. (Exhibit 5). That warning specifically advised if a similar incident occurred again claimant would be subject to further discipline, up to and including termination.

On May 8, 2018, LeGree met with claimant to discuss the situation. LeGree asked claimant to walk her through the closing procedures. LeGree testified claimant mentioned padlocking the dock doors when going through the closing procedures and later asked if a door was unlocked. (Exhibit 2). The decision was then made to discharge claimant from employment. Claimant testified she was not aware that she was responsible for checking the padlocks on the dock doors and thought the logistics department would do that. Claimant denied mentioning locking the dock doors to LeGree when they met on May 8. Claimant similarly denied failing to arm the alarm for the receiving room.

The claimant filed a new claim for unemployment insurance benefits with an effective date of May 6, 2018. The claimant filed for and received a total of \$2,275.00 in unemployment insurance benefits for the weeks between May 6 and June 16, 2018. The administrative record shows the employer provided a name and telephone number of a designated representative to participate in the fact-finding interview, as well as documentation regarding dates of employment, details of the final incident leading to the separation, and a copy of the applicable policy. The record further shows that the fact-finder attempted to call the employer's representative at 1:40 p.m. but received a message stating there was a high call volume. The employer provided credible testimony that its representative was available and waiting by the telephone but never received a call. The fact finder determined claimant qualified for benefits.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such

worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The Iowa Court of Appeals found substantial evidence of misconduct in testimony that the claimant worked slower than he was capable of working and would temporarily and briefly improve following oral reprimands. *Sellers v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 531 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Generally, continued refusal to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. *Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Co.*, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Misconduct must be "substantial" to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

The decision in this case rests, at least in part, on the credibility of the witnesses. It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

LeGree testified claimant was aware she was responsible for securing all doors, including the dock, and arming all three alarms. Claimant testified she was not aware she had to check the locks on the dock doors at the end of the evening and that she did arm the alarm for the receiving room on May 5, 2018. After assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, reviewing the exhibits submitted by the parties, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds the employer's version of events to be more credible than the claimant's recollection of those events.

The court in *Flesher v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 372 N.W.2d230 (Iowa 1985) found that repeated violations of an employer's security procedure can be misconduct. The employer is entitled to establish reasonable work rules and expect employees to abide by them. Claimant received a written warning on March 14, 2018 about ensuring all doors are properly locked and secure when closing the store. The warning advised claimant that further incidents could lead to termination. Claimant's repeated failure to accurately perform her job duties regarding proper lock-up procedures after having been warned is evidence of negligence or carelessness to such a degree of recurrence as to rise to the level of disqualifying job-related misconduct. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a. Benefits are denied.

The next issue is whether claimant has been overpaid benefits. Iowa Code § 96.3(7)a-b, as amended in 2008, provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1) (a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.

(b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to section 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this state pursuant to section 602.10101.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if unrebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

(2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.

(3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 96.3(7)“b” as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which she was not entitled. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by claimant. Additionally, the employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview. Thus, claimant is not obligated to repay to the agency the benefits she received.

The law also states that an employer is to be charged if “the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. . .” Iowa Code § 96.3(7)(b)(1)(a). Here, the employer responded to the notice of a fact-finding interview by faxing a document identifying the phone number at which the proper representatives could be reached for the fact-finding interview. Benefits were paid, but not because the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the agency's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. Instead, benefits were paid because employer did not receive a call from the agency. Employer thus cannot be charged. Since neither party is to be charged then the overpayment is absorbed by the fund.

**DECISION:**

The May 25, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. The claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of \$2,275.00 but is not obligated to repay the agency those benefits. The employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview due to no fault of its own and its account shall not be charged. Rather, the overpayment should be charged to the fund.

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Nicole Merrill  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

nm/rvs