## IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

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KEVIN J KUENSTLING Claimant	APPEAL NO: 10A-UI-07232-DT
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION
ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL Employer	
	OC: 04/18/10
	Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

# STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Allen Memorial Hospital (employer) appealed a representative's May 13, 2010 decision (reference 01) that concluded Kevin J. Kuenstling (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on July 8, 2010. The claimant participated in the hearing. Abby Meister appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Rick Grimm. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

### **ISSUE:**

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

### FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on September 22, 2003. He worked full time as a maintenance worker on a 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. shift. His last day of work was April 23, 2010. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was violation of the employer's attendance policy after other disciplinary actions.

The claimant had been given a warning on July 22, 2009 for taking a longer than allowed lunch. On September 9, 2009 he was given a warning for taking an early break. He was suspended on December 26 and December 27, a level three discipline, for an early clock in.

On April 21, 2010 the claimant called in to report he would be absent from work because of having a sore back. He called in at 6:17 a.m. for the 7:00 a.m. shift. The employer's policies require that a call in be made an hour prior to the shift. This had not been a prior issue with regard to any of the claimant's absences. He failed to ensure he had called in by 6:00 a.m. as he was not subjectively aware of the policy, even though he was on notice of the policy, and also because he had been attempting to treat himself at home so that he could come in for work, and did not determine until 6:17 a.m. that he was too sore to be able to work.

## **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Henry</u>, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. 871 IAC 24.32(7); <u>Cosper</u>, supra; <u>Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007). In this case, the employer asserts that the reason for the final absence was not properly reported, and therefore was misconduct. However, it is clear that the claimant's failure to report his absence an hour before the start of his shift was not volitional, as he had not even determined he was too sore to work until he called at 6:17 a.m. Therefore, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. The claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

# **DECISION:**

The representative's May 13, 2010 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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