IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

BOBBY D JARMON

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-07092-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

SEARS ROEBUCK & COMPANY

Employer

OC: 04/10/11

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Sears, Roebuck & Company (employer) appealed a representative's May 18, 2011 decision (reference 01) that concluded Bobby D. Jarmon (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on June 22, 2011. The claimant participated in the hearing. Kary Grant appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

After a prior period of employment with the employer's West Des Moines, Iowa call center, the claimant started working for the employer's Des Moines, Iowa retail store on March 1, 2011. He worked part-time (15-25 hours per week) as a home improvement sales associate. His last day of work was April 22, 2011. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism.

Prior to April 15, the claimant had missed work on March 6, March 11, March 12, March 20, March 22, April 1, and April 2. All but the March 20 and March 22 absences were due to properly reported illness. The March 20 and March 22 absences were no-call, no-shows because the claimant had not realized he had been scheduled to work those days. After the no-call, no-shows, the claimant's supervisor had verbally discussed his attendance with him, but the claimant was not given any written warnings or advised that after the additional absences on April 1 and April 2 that his job was in jeopardy.

The final occurrence that led to the employer's discharge decision was an absence on April 15. The claimant did properly report he would be absent that day due to illness. The employer then determined that the claimant was missing too much work and determined to discharge him.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits, an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission that was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. lowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (lowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984).

Absenteeism can constitute misconduct; however, to be misconduct, absences must be both excessive and unexcused. 871 IAC 24.32(7). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. 871 IAC 24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007). Because the final absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred that establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. Cosper, supra. The claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's May 18, 2011 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Language A. E. Dangara

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/kjw