

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

ALEJANDRO PEREZ-PIZANO
Claimant

LECLAIRE MANUFACTURING CO
Employer

APPEAL 21A-UI-07746-ML-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 12/06/20
Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the March 12, 2021, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon his separation from employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on May 6, 2021. The claimant, Alejandro Perez-Pizano, participated personally. The employer failed to register for the hearing and did not participate. Interpretive services were provided by CTS Language Link.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?
Did claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to employer?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a Machine Operator. Claimant was employed from sometime in 2016 until December 8, 2020. Claimant's immediate supervisor was Andrew Jones.

On December 8, 2020, claimant engaged in an argument with supervisor Andrew Jones. Mr. Jones requested that claimant perform work activities that were outside of his normal job duties due to a shortage in the workforce that day. When claimant refused, Mr. Jones told claimant to "leave and not come back." Claimant perceived this communication as a firing and walked off of the jobsite. Claimant was not present for his scheduled shifts the remainder of the week. Claimant did not follow up with the employer to check on his work status, and the employer did not contact claimant to ask why he was not present to work.

Claimant was brought back to work, or rehired by the employer on April 26, 2021. According to claimant, Mr. Jones no longer works for the employer. The employer allegedly told claimant that it was under the impression claimant walked off the job and voluntarily quit his employment. Claimant told the employer that this was not the case, and that Mr. Jones actually terminated his employment.

Prior to discharge, claimant had received verbal warnings for taking extended breaks. He did not believe his employment status was in jeopardy prior to December 8, 2020. He did not know that he could be fired for declining work he did not know how to do.

I find that claimant did not intend to quit his employment. Ultimately, I find claimant did not voluntarily quit his employment. Instead, I find he was discharged by the employer.

Employer offered no evidence to establish the basis for claimant's discharge. Accordingly, I find that the employer failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that claimant was discharged for misconduct.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

Iowa Code §96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.24(____) provides:

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

In the present case, claimant did not abandon his job or voluntarily quit his employment when he did not present to work after December 8, 2020. Rather, claimant felt he was discharged when his supervisor told him to "leave and not come back." I agree. I find claimant was

discharged from work by his supervisor on December 8, 2020. As such, this case must be analyzed to determine if claimant was discharged for misconduct.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).

What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be “substantial.” *Newman v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus of the administrative code definition of misconduct is on deliberate, intentional or culpable acts by the employee. *Id.* When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a “wrongful intent” to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer’s interests. *Henry v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Further, poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000)(fact that claimant, who was a snowplower, had two accidents involving utility lines within three days did not constitute misconduct such as would disqualify claimant from receiving unemployment benefits; there was no evidence that claimant intentionally or deliberately damaged utility lines or violated any traffic laws, and there was uncontroverted evidence that accidents were beyond claimant’s control).

To establish misconduct that will disqualify employee from unemployment compensation benefits, employer must prove conduct by employee consisted of deliberate acts or omissions or evinced such carelessness as to indicate wrongful intent. It should not be accepted as a given fact that an employer’s subjective standards set the measure of proof necessary to establish misconduct; to do so skews procedure, forcing employees to prove that they are not capable of doing their job or that they had no intent to commit misconduct, thereby impermeably shifting the burden from employer to employee. *Kelly v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service*, 386 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa App. 1986).


The employer did not testify or submit a written statement. The employer did not provide any evidence to rebut claimant’s testimony. The employer did not provide any evidence of a policy claimant violated on December 8, 2020.

The employer has failed to prove that the claimant acted in any deliberate way to breach the duties or obligations of his employment contract. There was no willful or wanton action or omission of claimant which was a deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of claimant. The employer failed to prove claimant acted with carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.

As such, employer has failed to prove that claimant was discharged for any current act of job-related misconduct that would disqualify him from receiving benefits. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The March 12, 2021, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision is REVERSED. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. Any benefits claimed and withheld on this basis shall be paid.



Michael J. Lunn
Administrative Law Judge
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June 8, 2021
Decision Dated and Mailed

mjl/kmj