IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

MARIA E GAYTAN Claimant

APPEAL NO: 07A-UI-04572-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC Employer

> OC: 04/08/07 R: 04 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.5-1 – Voluntary Leaving Section 96.4-3 – Able and Available 871 IAC 24.22(2)j – Leave of Absence

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Maria E. Gaytan (claimant) appealed a representative's April 27, 2007 decision (reference 01) that concluded she was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits in conjunction with her employment with Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 30, 2007. The claimant participated in the hearing and was represented by William Bribriesco, attorney at law. The employer failed to respond to the hearing notice and provide a telephone number at which a witness or representative could be reached for the hearing and did not participate in the hearing. Ike Rocha served as interpreter. During the hearing, Claimant's Exhibits A and B were entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct? Is the claimant eligible for unemployment insurance benefits by being able and available for employment?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on May 17, 2005. She worked full time as a meat cutter on the first shift in the employer's Columbus Junction, Iowa meat processing facility. Her last day of work was April 9, 2007.

The claimant sustained a work-related injury to her left shoulder on November 21, 2005. She received treatment through the employer's workers' compensation program. On February 27, 2007 the workers' compensation treating practitioner reported the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and was given a final release for restricted work with permanent restrictions including rare reaching, pulling, or pushing with her left arm, a lifting limit

of 15 pounds occasionally, and a push/pull limit of 45 pounds occasionally. The claimant had been performing some light duty work with the employer prior to this release; however, technically that work also did not comply with the permanent restrictions. The employer then advised the claimant that it was up to her to find a position within the company that she could do with her restrictions and that she had a month to do so.

The claimant identified various positions in the company but was advised that they did not meet her restrictions. On April 9, 2007 the employer informed the claimant she could no longer continue to work in the position she had been working; she was presented with a "leave of absence application" to begin April 10, 2007 and to end on April 10, 2008; the claimant declined to sign the application. She was then directed to leave the facility and to check back each week to see if suitable work had become available to her.

The claimant is able to perform some work such as restaurant or light industrial work for which she has been making job applications.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A voluntary quit is a termination of employment initiated by the employee – where the employee has taken the action which directly results in the separation; a discharge is a termination of employment initiated by the employer – where the employer has taken the action which directly results in the separation from employment. 871 IAC 24.1(113)(b), (c). A claimant is not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits if she quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer or was discharged for work-connected misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.25 provides that, in general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. <u>Bartelt v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 494 N.W.2d 684 (lowa 1993). The employer asserted that the claimant was not discharged but that she quit by being unable to perform her regular duties and being placed on a leave of absence. The administrative law judge concludes that the employer has failed to satisfy its burden that the claimant voluntarily left her position or agreed to be placed on leave of absence status. Iowa Code § 96.6-2. Particularly as the claimant's restrictions were due to a work-related injury, even though the claimant was willing to stay and continue her employment, the employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodations is not a "voluntary quit." 871 IAC 24.26(6)b. As the separation was not a voluntary quit, it must be treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment insurance. 871 IAC 24.26(21).

The issue in this case is then whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the

claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

- 1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or

b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or

- 2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 - 1. The employer's interest, or
 - 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The reason the employer effectively discharged the claimant was its decision not to affirmatively find or create a position for the claimant within her restrictions. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

In the alternative, even if considered to be a "voluntary quit," the separation is not disqualifying.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.26(6)b provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(6) Separation because of illness, injury, or pregnancy.

b. Employment related separation. The claimant was compelled to leave employment because of an illness, injury, or allergy condition that was attributable to the employment. Factors and circumstances directly connected with the employment which caused or aggravated the illness, injury, allergy, or disease to the employee which made it impossible for the employee to continue in employment because of serious danger to the employee's health may be held to be an involuntary termination of employment and constitute good cause attributable to the employer. The claimant will be eligible for benefits if compelled to leave employment as a result of an injury suffered on the job. In order to be eligible under this paragraph "b" an individual must present competent evidence showing adequate health reasons to justify termination; before quitting have informed the employer of the work-related health problem and inform the employer that

the individual intends to quit unless the problem is corrected or the individual is reasonably accommodated. Reasonable accommodation includes other comparable work which is not injurious to the claimant's health and for which the claimant must remain available.

The claimant has satisfied the requirements of the rule. The employer was unable or unwilling to provide reasonable accommodation in order to retain the claimant's employment. "Good cause attributable to the employer" does not require fault, negligence, wrongdoing or bad faith by the employer, but may be attributable to the employment itself. <u>Dehmel v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 433 N.W.2d 700 (lowa1988); <u>Raffety v. Iowa Employment Security Commission</u>, 76 N.W.2d 787 (lowa 1956). Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

The next issue in this case is whether the claimant is eligible for unemployment insurance benefits by being able and available for employment.

Iowa Code § 96.4-3 provides:

An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the department finds that:

3. The individual is able to work, is available for work, and is earnestly and actively seeking work. This subsection is waived if the individual is deemed partially unemployed, while employed at the individual's regular job, as defined in section 96.19, subsection 38, paragraph "b", unnumbered paragraph 1, or temporarily unemployed as defined in section 96.19, subsection 38, paragraph "c". The work search requirements of this subsection and the disqualification requirement for failure to apply for, or to accept suitable work of section 96.5, subsection 3 are waived if the individual is not disqualified for benefits under section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraph "h".

871 IAC 24.22(2)j(1)(2)(3) provides:

Benefit eligibility conditions. For an individual to be eligible to receive benefits the department must find that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly and actively seeking work. The individual bears the burden of establishing that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly and actively seeking work.

j. Leave of absence. A leave of absence negotiated with the consent of both parties, employer and employee, is deemed a period of voluntary unemployment for the employee-individual, and the individual is considered ineligible for benefits for the period.

(1) If at the end of a period or term of negotiated leave of absence the employer fails to reemploy the employee-individual, the individual is considered laid off and eligible for benefits.

(2) If the employee-individual fails to return at the end of the leave of absence and subsequently becomes unemployed the individual is considered as having voluntarily quit and therefore is ineligible for benefits.

(3) The period or term of a leave of absence may be extended, but only if there is evidence that both parties have voluntarily agreed.

871 IAC 24.22(1)a provides:

(1) Able to work. An individual must be physically and mentally able to work in some gainful employment, not necessarily in the individual's customary occupation, but which is engaged in by others as a means of livelihood.

a. Illness, injury or pregnancy. Each case is decided upon an individual basis, recognizing that various work opportunities present different physical requirements. A statement from a medical practitioner is considered prima facie evidence of the physical ability of the individual to perform the work required. A pregnant individual must meet the same criteria for determining ableness as do all other individuals.

While the employer may consider the claimant to be on a "leave of absence," this does not bar the claimant from eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits as in this case it is not a "voluntary" period of unemployment – the placement of the claimant on leave status was not "negotiated with the consent of both parties." While the claimant may not be physically able to do her prior job, she has demonstrated that she is able to work in some gainful employment. Sierra v. Employment Appeal Board, 508 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Iowa 1993); Geiken v. Lutheran Home for the Aged, 468 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1991); 871 IAC 24.22(1). Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The representative's April 27, 2007 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The claimant is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits as being able and available for some gainful employment. She did not voluntarily quit her employment but the employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs