IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

MICHAEL A CARLSON

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 09A-UI-18855-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

CONTRACT TRANSPORT INC

Employer

Original Claim: 11/15/09 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed a timely appeal from the December 9, 2009 (reference 01) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on January 25, 2010. Claimant participated with Leila Carlson. Employer participated through Jean Nible and Alan Bergman. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted to the record.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant most recently worked full-time as a regional driver and was separated from employment on November 10, 2009. He was tardy on October 14 he was late with a postal run. The deadline was 19:25 and he arrived at 20:07. (Employer's Exhibit 10) The postal service called dispatch to notify the employer of the tardiness on October 14 and forwarded it on October 27. He had a minor unreported accident on November 7, which would not have resulted in his termination from employment.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

871 IAC 24.32(8) provides: Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based upon such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based upon a current act. A lapse of 11 days from the final act until discharge when claimant was notified on the fourth day that his conduct was grounds for dismissal did not make the final act a "past act." *Greene v. EAB*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (lowa 1988).

Inasmuch as employer had knowledge of the October 14, 2009 final incident of unexcused tardiness and there were no incidents of alleged misconduct thereafter, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or negligently after the most recent warning until the November 10, 2009 separation. Employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The December 9, 2009 (reference 01) decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible. The benefits withheld effective the week ending November 21, 2009 shall be paid to claimant.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/kjw