IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

LORI E MOORE

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-14615-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TRINITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

Employer

OC: 10/16/11

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the November 3, 2011 (reference 01) decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on December 5, 2011. Claimant participated with former housekeeper Janet Ward and was represented by Keith Ferguson, Attorney at Law. Employer participated through human resources manager Ted Vaughn, manager of communications Kerri Krueger, and housekeeper Julie Bethel.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed part-time as a communications operator from October 1999 and was separated from employment on July 15, 2011. On July 9, 2011 according to Bethel and housekeeper Heather Cole, claimant appeared to be sleeping when she was holding and reading her book. They stood there for about three or four minutes watching her and noted her eyes appeared to be closed. They "slammed" the office window open and startled her. Someone reported it to Krueger. Communications operators are allowed to read on the job. Claimant had been disciplined for behavior and attendance but not for sleeping on the job. Ward was laid off on May 1, 2011.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Sleeping on the job on two occasions, one year apart can constitute job misconduct. *Hurtado v. IDJS*, 393 N.W.2d 309 (lowa 1986).

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The conduct for which claimant was discharged was not established to be sleeping on the job as claimant's rebuttal was credible. Even had she been sleeping, the incident was isolated and the employer has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled

to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The November 3, 2011 (reference 0)1)	decision is affirmed.	Claimant	was	discharged	from
employment for no disqualifying reaso	n.	Benefits are allowed.				

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs