IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JOSHUA A BACHMAN

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 14A-UI-09392-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

DEXTER LAUNDRY INC

Employer

OC: 08/17/14

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed a timely appeal from the September 8, 2014, reference 01, decision that disqualified him for benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on October 1, 2014. Claimant participated. Kathy Baker represented the employer and presented additional testimony through Todd Reifsteck. Exhibits One through 12 were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed as a full-time production worker until August 12, 2014 when the employer discharged him for an incident that occurred on August 7, 2014. On August 7, the claimant was having difficulty running the machine he was assigned to operate during that shift and attempted to bring his concerns to the attention of the supervisor, Ed Sammons, Shift Supervisor. Mr. Sammons perceived the claimant to be insubordinate and reported the interaction up the chain of command as insubordination. The employer alleges that the claimant told the supervisor to get the hell away from him. The claimant denies that allegation. The employer considered prior conduct in making the decision to discharge the claimant. The next most recent incident that factored in the discharge occurred on or about July 3, 2014.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s) alone. The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also <u>Greene v. EAB</u>, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. lowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (lowa 1976).

Continued failure to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. See <u>Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Company</u>, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa App. 1990). An employee's failure to perform

a specific task may not constitute misconduct if such failure is in good faith or for good cause. See <u>Woods v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 327 N.W.2d 768, 771 (lowa 1982). The administrative law judge must analyze situations involving alleged insubordination by evaluating the reasonableness of the employer's request in light of the circumstances, along with the worker's reason for non-compliance. See <u>Endicott v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 367 N.W.2d 300 (lowa Ct. App. 1985).

An employer has the right to expect decency and civility from its employees and an employee's use of profanity or offensive language in a confrontational, disrespectful, or name-calling context may be recognized as misconduct disqualifying the employee from receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. Henecke v. lowa Department of Job Service, 533 N.W.2d 573 (lowa App. 1995). Use of foul language can alone be a sufficient ground for a misconduct disqualification for unemployment benefits. Warrell v. lowa Dept. of Job Service, 356 N.W.2d 587 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). An isolated incident of vulgarity can constitute misconduct and warrant disqualification from unemployment benefits, if it serves to undermine a superior's authority. Deever v. Hawkeye Window Cleaning, Inc. 447 N.W.2d 418 (lowa Ct. App. 1989).

The employer has presented insufficient evidence, and insufficiently direct and satisfactory evidence, to establish a current act of misconduct that might serve as a basis for disqualifying the claimant for benefits. The employer did not present testimony from Mr. Sammons. Aside from the claimant, Mr. Sammons was the only person with personal knowledge of the incident that triggered the discharge. The employer had the ability to present testimony from Mr. Sammons. The employer has failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut the claimant's assertion that he was merely attempting to bring his concerns about the machinery to the supervisor and neither yelled nor used profanity. The next most recent that factored in the discharged occurred at the beginning of July and would not constitute a current act of misconduct.

Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, the claimant is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits.

DECISION:

The claims deputy's September 8, 2014, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

James E. Timberland Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	

jet/pjs