

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

CAROLINE D BYRD
Claimant

MASTERTSON PERSONNEL INC
Employer

APPEAL 17A-UI-12004-LJ-T
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 10/01/17
Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism
Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the November 15, 2017 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon a determination that claimant voluntarily quit her temporary employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on December 12, 2017. The claimant, Caroline D. Byrd, participated. The employer, Mastertson Personnel, Inc., participated through Chris Fewell, Recruiter/On-Site Supervisor; and Jim Robertson, Unemployment Operations Manager. Claimant's Exhibits A through F were received and admitted into the record without objection.

ISSUE:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to the employer or did employer discharge the claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time, most recently as a temporary employee on the de-bone line, from July 12, 2017 until August 7, 2017, when she quit her employment. On August 7, 2017, claimant abandoned her shift after the first break. She did not notify Fewell, the on-site supervisor that she was leaving. Claimant was experiencing a medical issue and she ended up in the hospital. Claimant did not report any subsequent absences to the employer. On or about September 1, claimant reported back to the employer and was reassigned.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant separated from her employment without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld.

Iowa Code §96.5(1) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Here, claimant denies she had any intention to quit her employment. Therefore, this case will be analyzed as a discharge and the employer bears the burden to establish disqualifying misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
 - a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

- (7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit*, supra. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984).

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate

notice.” *Cosper* at 10. The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). When no excuse is given for an absence at the time of the absence and no reason is given in the record, an absence is deemed unexcused. *Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Iowa 1984). See also *Spragg v. Becker-Underwood, Inc.*, 672 N.W.2d 333, 2003 WL 22339237 (Iowa App. 2003).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness’s testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* After assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds the employer’s testimony credible regarding the events of August 7, 2017. The administrative law judge believes claimant left work after her first break that day and did not report back for nearly one month.

An employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified as to when and why the employee is unable to report to work. Here, claimant stopped reporting to work without any information as to the reason for her absence. Claimant’s lengthy absence from work without any explanation amounts to excessive, unexcused absenteeism even without prior warning. Benefits are withheld.

DECISION:

The November 15, 2017 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Elizabeth A. Johnson
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

lj/scn